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The United States Marine Corps will bring toughness, vision, and refined tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from a 13-year desert fight into the next major combat 
operation or small contingency. This Marine Corps proclivity for action is reflected in 
driven Marines, doctrine and the personnel carriers or vehicles used by Marines to 
execute maneuver warfare from the sea. The first responder for the next contingency will 
likely be the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is the smallest seabased 
configuration of a Marine Air Ground Task Force. The MEU provides rapid crisis 
response from U.S. Navy ships and is likely to be the principal component of the future 
force at sea. This research informs the top procurement priorities for the United States 
Navy by evaluating the MEU’s expeditionary amphibious assault capability and the use 
of ship-to-shore connectors. In hundreds of thousands of simulated assaults, it identifies 
TTPs and mission profiles that achieve increased operational effectiveness, while 
employing less operational energy. The major results quantify the benefits of debarking 
amphibious forces at closer distances, show that a self-deployer presents a significant 
advantage to the landing force, and reveal the diminishing returns of high water speed. 
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In the wake of cost overruns the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in 2011 was 
terminated, and the U.S. Marine Corp transitioned to a tough amphibian, the Amphibious 
Combat Vehicle (ACV). This vehicle, in its current increment, will leverage ship-to-shore 
connectors (SSCs) to meet the challenges presented from objective maneuver from the 
sea (OMFTS). Marines perform amphibious operations with forces that are scalable and 
tailorable, meaning that these operations may elevate from a benign landing (e.g., New 
Orleans during Katrina) to a joint forcible entry operation (e.g., Omaha Beach) on distant 
shore. Incidentally, amphibious operations are highly complex, which raises many 
questions: 
 Does the U.S. Marine corps require a self-deploying capability similar to 
the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which conducts ship to 
objective maneuver (STOM)? 
 What are the right measures of performance (MOP) for an amphibious 
operation, namely a system of connectors delivering many systems of 
amphibious combat vehicles? 
 What ranges from the shore and speeds present challenges to an 
amphibious operation given modern technology? 
 What are the impacts and drivers of operational energy and how can the 
U.S. Marine Corps maintain mission effectiveness? 
 Are there solutions that afford the same operational effectiveness, yet 
reduce operational energy from the seabase being distributed?  
This research uses a two-stage simulation to model an end-to-end amphibious 
assault, which addresses these questions. The sponsor for this research was the 
Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O), USMC. Initial progress reviews revealed that the 
Marine Corps has many spreadsheet-based and specific tools; however, the stakeholder 
needed a broad analysis of expeditionary operations. The top acquisitions priority for the 
Marine Corps pertains to Title 10 amphibious requirements. Thus, a broad analysis for an 
amphibious operation is conducted. A discrete event simulation in a Simulation Modeling 
framework based on Intelligent Objects (Simio) models aircraft launch constraints from 
 xxvi 
the seabase. Meanwhile, an agent-based adversarial model in Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata (MANA) models the amphibious assault. 
Once the model structure was established, the author used a model-test-model 
approach that refined terrain, adversary capabilities, and landing force scheme of 
maneuver (SOM) to gain operational insights. Many hundreds of thousands of simulated 
amphibious assaults were conducted with a broad range of parameters in efficient, space-
filling experiments, involving 77 mixed (i.e., discrete and continuous) factors with 512 
design points for four different scenarios. Run times for a single experiment took 
approximately 10 minutes, so the excursions were completed using a high-performance 
computing cluster. In the end, advanced metamodels were selected from linear, non-
linear, regression, and partition tree analyses.  
The ACV, AAV upgrade, and next SSC all present major Department of Defense 
programmatic decisions. This research informs these decisions leveraging a traceable 
scenario throughout to better assist decision makers in providing the warfighter the right 
capabilities. The major findings follow.   
 STOM-vertically (STOM-V) presents a future challenge for the Marine 
Corp—not in the distance that can be covered, but in the force protection 
provided to Marines once on the ground. 
 The adversary will be highly influenced by the ends, ways, and means of 
an attacking force during amphibious assault.  
 The ACV swim and on-land speed do not need to be as fast as current top 
capabilities.  
 An ACV with an autonomous ship-to-shore increment (i.e., self-deployer) 
presents a significant advantage to the landing force. 
  Distances offshore can range as far as 12 nm without interference to the 
amphibious assault.  
 Different types of urban terrain may degrade the defending forces ability 
to target the landing force.  
This thesis provides an innovative approach for developing meta-models of 
operational effectiveness. These meta-models are part of a prototype “dashboard” for 
 xxvii 
E2O that links operational effectiveness and operational energy to facilitate trade-space 
explorations. 
In summary, the force that responds to the next crisis or contingency will be the 
force that is closest to it—the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) embarked on ships. 
This research is leaning forward by making a first attempt at modeling an end-to-end 
amphibious assault. In hundreds of thousands of simulated amphibious assaults, we 
observe the trade-space formed by the many complex parameters considered when 
employing concept complementary platforms of surface and vertical ship-to-objective-
maneuver. In the end, we realize quantifiable values that maximize mission effectiveness 
and better inform the top procurement priorities for the United States Naval forces.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you can see  
—Winston Churchill 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 
October 1951–April 1955 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to further analyze complex, amphibious operations 
in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) situations, based on a traceable scenario, in order to 
provide a tool for decision makers to explore operational effectiveness and operational 
energy in amphibious operations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been 
using amphibious vehicles for launching assaults from the sea since 1776, but modern-
day circumstances are driving the need for an agent-based tool—primarily, the advent of 
expensive technology in the amphibious vehicle capability and the variety of equipment 
that can be based at sea against an adaptive adversary. The Marine Corps can explore 
new technology based at sea in a cost-effective environment that allows stakeholders to 
visualize billions of dollars of equipment prior to it being procured. This thesis uses 
campaign analysis techniques, agent-based simulation, and discrete event simulation in a 
broad analysis of conceptual ship-to-shore connectors and developing Marine amphibious 
combat vehicle technology during a seabased amphibious assault.  
The principal arm for scalable Marine amphibious operations is the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). In order to provide rapid crisis response from U.S. Navy 
ships, the MEU must be highly trained to this end, the over 2,200 Marines and hundreds 
of aircraft in a MEU regularly conduct a minimum of six months of work-ups, followed 
by certification-at-sea periods, and deployments around the globe. The principal benefit 
of this thesis is incorporating the findings of this research and applying them to 
persistent, regularly scheduled operations. Findings that, once applied to all seven of the 
currently active MEUs, may very well influence operational energy consumption for the 
United States. This effect would be multiplied annually by the three operational and four 
in reserves, rotation cycle of the MEU. Even MEUs that are not deployed operationally, 
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those conducting work-ups to replace them, conduct hundreds of theater security 
cooperation and training operations. Furthermore, the agent-based model employed in 
this analysis is unlike any other—for it models that which has been too complex to model 
until now—amphibious assault. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The amphibious combat community is highly capable, and the aim of this 
research is to help inform the vision of the future amphibious assault force. To better 
serve the leadership of Marines fighting in future wars and to aid in making better data-
driven decisions, this model tackles what has been avoided for too long due to 
complexity—modeling the amphibious assault. Marines need a tool that attacks the 
complex, ship-to-shore amphibious transition with the same level of intensity that they 
will be expected to produce when they launch an amphibious assault. Additional 
motivation for this thesis stems from combined research between the Operations 
Research (OR) and Systems Engineering (SE) Departments at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS). Professors from both departments at NPS have dedicated much of their 
research to providing a dashboard for the United States Marine Corps that uses ensembles 
of models, commonly referred to as metamodels, to show operational energy and 
operational effectiveness. The author is incorporating work from a year-long SE 
capstone, Operational Energy/Operational Effectiveness Investigation for Scalable 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade Forces in Contingency Response Scenarios (Team 
Expeditionary & Cohort 311-132, 2014) to further investigate the feasibility of using 
amphibious assault operations with future programs and technology, such as concept 
ship-to-shore connectors (SSCs), amphibious combat vehicles (ACVs) and other Marine 
Personnel Carriers (MPCs). Sponsoring this research is the Marine Corp’s Expeditionary 
Energy Office (E2O). In 2009, then Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), James T. 
Conway, formed E2O to “analyze, develop, and direct the Marine Corps’ energy strategy 
in order to optimize expeditionary capabilities across all warfighting functions” (Marine 
Corps Expeditionary Energy Office [E2O], 2012). The modeling implemented in this 
thesis is currently being used by a second systems engineering research team in support 
of their master’s research, and lays the groundwork for further studies as well. 
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C. OBJECTIVES 
This research is guided by the following research questions, whereby the 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are mission time, friendly casualties, and Red 
casualties: 
 What are the ACV measures of performance (MOPs) that positively 
contribute to the MOEs? 
 What are the SSC MOPs that positively contribute to the MOEs? 
While we do not know exactly what enemies future Marine amphibious combat 
systems will face, it would be unwise to assume away the threat and that future adversary 
as being anything less than formidable, adaptive, and located deep inside a complex 
coastal defense. While the U.S. has invested in ships, other states have taken advantage of 
more affordable coastal defense missile systems. The natural defense created by the 
terrain of sea, surf, and sand gives an edge to the enemy. This is further complicated by 
asymmetric threats, A2/AD capabilities, and modern warfare technologies, making it 
difficult for decision makers to select the right capabilities amid uncertainty. In order for 
Marine leadership to continue to function and successfully conduct amphibious assault 
operations, new technology must be robust to a variety of missions and scenarios. This 
research delivers results, facts, and a tool for the future rapid, data-driven decision 
making—appropriate for Marines to adopt and use to destroy the enemy. 
D. SCOPE 
The primary focus of this thesis is to quantify the benefits of distributing assets 
among platforms found in seabase operations during an amphibious assault. In support of 
that focus, this thesis develops a visualization tool of the amphibious assault operation. 
This thesis uses agent based simulation software, Map Aware Non-uniform Automata 
(MANA, version 5.0 [V]), and discrete event simulation software, SImulation Modeling 
framework based on Intelligent Objects (Simio, version 7.0), to develop scenarios and 
simulations. The MANA and Simio scenarios and simulations used work well with 
numerous vertical and surface Marine platforms. The Simio simulation is particularly 
useful to realize the benefit to operating Marine aircraft distributed across air capable 
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ships. Meanwhile, the MANA scenario uses a large number of agents and decision 
factors to model everything from an M1A1 tank, to an SSC, to a Marine infantry fire 
team (FT). 
The following five chapters develop an innovative approach for the expansion of 
future Marine Corps amphibious capability using simulation modeling. Amphibious 
operations require logistics. As a result, others have developed several limited tools 
implementing visual basic for applications (VBA) and discrete-event simulations (DES) 
to calculate massing force ashore absent the enemy. These tools may include stochastic 
elements, but are incapable of providing insight when an adaptive adversary is present. In 
contrast, the research in this thesis is unique, combining both discrete and agent-based 
simulations to explore a range of specifications and impacts on operational energy and 
operational effectiveness in likely amphibious scenarios against an enemy. Chapters I and 
II introduce the research and the approaches made by others to model amphibious 
operations. Chapters III and IV cover the two simulation methodologies, namely agent 
based and discrete-event simulations. Chapter VI and VII cover the quantitative analysis, 
conclusions, and recommendations as they pertain to energy insights, operational 
insights, and future work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 
There is much written from great and experienced military theorists, such as  
Sun Tzu, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, which the U.S. Armed Forces 
use to be prepared for positions of operational leadership, and to think strategically about 
all types of wars and the means used fight them (U.S. Naval War College, 2015). While 
all three theorists may not agree on how best to conduct forcible entry from the sea, 
Griffith’s rendition of Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’ says, “attack where he is unprepared,” 
and seabased forces provide this capability (Griffith, 1971, p. 69). Where disagreement 
may also arise is, which of the multifaceted technologies of today best help accomplish 
this mission? Undoubtedly, what is not covered by history is modern-day, complex, 
concept platform integration. Developments of new SSCs and armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) (e.g., ACVs, MPCs, etc.) can be defined in terms of specifications and system 
performance, typically quantified as MOPs. Yet, it is often the systems of systems that 
contribute toward mission accomplishment, typically quantified as MOEs. Amphibious 
assault, and the technological advancements made therein, present unique challenges to 
the adversary. Platform-intensive operations, however, significantly increase the 
complexity of battle. So, while belligerent nations must defend their coasts against a 
hovercraft that can carry a formidable force quickly from well over the horizon (OTH), 
this capable connector is susceptible to battle damage and breaking down. If we assume 
no battle damage to vehicles, and no personnel destroyed, as with most DESs and 
calculators, then we fail to capture what centuries of theorists have been saying not to 
discount—the enemy. Hence, this research considers the impact of the enemy on the 
mission, rather than MOPs that only focus on the isolated performance of each system. 
A counter argument to logistic calculators and complex platforms is the impact of 
U.S. Marine Corps leadership, bravery, and experience—all of which provide a 
formidable edge that is unquantifiable. The Marine Corps history of amphibious 
operations stretches from 1776 to 2006. While the Bahamas in 1776 represent the first 
amphibious operation, Veracruz, in 1846, was the first major joint amphibious operation. 
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Marine Captain Alvin Edson led a battalion (BN) of Marines on 9 March 1846, thus 
executing the first joint forcible entry operation (JFEO), with the support of over 8,000 
soldiers, sailors, and Marines (U.S. History., 2015). Few real-time analysis tools have 
been made with the modernizations of amphibious assault technology in mind. As we 
explore past studies, according to Clausewitz’s On War: “Critical analysis is not just an 
evaluation of the means actually employed, but of all possible means—which first have to 
be formulated, that is, invented. One can, after all, not condemn a method without being 
able to suggest a better alternative” (Howard, Paret, & West, 1984, p. 161). To this end, 
this research aims to build on other work that incorporates a vast breadth of research 
investment into making the Marine Corps an even more capable force. 
This section addresses some of the misperceptions of amphibious operations. In 
his memoirs, Sir Walter Raleigh wrote, “It is more difficult to defend a coast than to 
invade it” (Edwards, 1868, p. 239). According to Col. Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC 
(Ret.), “Americans can always refuse to pay for maintaining an amphibious capability, 
thereby giving up what Liddell Hart calls ‘the greatest strategic asset that the sea-based 
power possesses.’ If Americans should choose to take such a step, they will have, in 
effect, accomplished what no enemy has managed to do: defeat a modern amphibious 
operation” (Gatchel, 1996, p. 217). History only gives us so much as we prepare for 
future wars. Meanwhile, the “record of amphibious warfare in the twentieth century 
seems to validate Sir Walter Raleigh’s assessment that defending against an amphibious 
operation is more difficult than conducting one” (Gatchel, 1996, p. 216). Amphibious 
operations include two opposing forces: the defender and the attacker. There is a common 
perception that the attacker in an amphibious operation incurs high risk and with that, 
higher numbers of casualties. Gatchel offers, this reputation is from few, notorious 
landings that resulted in historic levels of casualties only after the force was ashore. 
Amphibious operations where high casualties were incurred as a result of the amphibious 
operation were Tarawa and Omaha Beach at Normandy (Gatchel, 1996). Seldom are 
casualties attributed to the character of the amphibious operations, which is further 
exemplified by the safe landings at Guadalcanal and Okinawa. During both of these 
operations Marines encountered formidable defensive forces, not during the landing 
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itself, but during the taking of the island. Colonel Gatchel offers that both Guadalcanal 
and Okinawa fuel the misperception of amphibious assault with high casualties that were 
incurred long after forces were massed ashore (Gatchel, 1996).  
1. Distributed Combat Systems  
Spreading out combat power can mitigate the risk associated with amphibious 
operations. One way to minimize risk in land, air, naval, amphibious, and now cyber 
operations is through survivability distribution (Hoe, 2001). According to Captain Keith 
Jude Hoe, Singapore Armed Forces, and NPS student, a potential benefit to dispersed 
seabased operations is that multiple platforms reduce risk. For example, Captain Hoe 
found that staying power does not increase much with increased tonnage or size. 
Moreover, that a ship that displaces 7,000 tons or less requires approximately a single hit 
from an Exocet missile, while a larger, 90,000-ton ship requires only 2.3 missiles, based 
on a proportional increase in missiles required. This, he continues to say is a 
“phenomenon that poses a dilemma for naval planners” (Hoe, 2001, p. 38). Is it 
advantageous to build a massive ship with awesome firepower that has limited staying 
ability, or many smaller ships that aggregate to both massive firepower and staying 
ability? The Marine Corps is facing a similar challenge with SSC. Arguably, a large, lone 
connector, exemplified by the concept Ultra Heavy Lift Amphibious Connector (UHAC) 
or concept SSC, fully loaded, masses force ashore in a similar manner as the 90,000-ton 
ship masses firepower. Meanwhile, a smaller SSC or self-deploying Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAV) increases survivability—and resilience—by distributing Marines across 
MPCs capable of withstanding a collective increase in missile strikes.  
The Marine Corps is not alone in its interest in distributed operations. The Army’s 
Future Combat System (FCS) though eventually cancelled, was envisioned for distributed 
operations (Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab [UAMBL], 2003). The FCS was an 
example of a major Army acquisitions modernization program with many subsystems. 
Some of these included weapons systems and others included communications 
equipment; however, all of these components were intended to network together to form 
a tough combat unit. The FCS brigade was designed to be both expeditionary in nature, 
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and able to conduct day and night distributed operations. Since the FCS represented many 
systems, the loss of one subsystem in battle would not mean the loss of the whole. 
2. The Role of Connectors in Amphibious Operations 
Ship-to-shore (sometimes called seabase-to-shore) connectors play an important role 
in amphibious operations, and model-based tools that provide insight about their 
effectiveness could be beneficial to decision makers. Few tools exist, and those that do have 
limitations. For example, the SSC Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) conducted in 2007 
illustrates the complexity of modeling SSCs and amphibious operations coupled with the 
inadequacies of spreadsheet modeling (Department of the Navy, 2007). This AoA focus is on 
the mission of providing ship-to-shore transport of joint forces within Ship-to-Objective 
Maneuver (STOM) and other assault and non-assault (e.g., humanitarian, etc.) operations 
launched from the Seabase. The methods used in the SSC AoA “developed an EXTEND 
[discrete event simulation] DES model and three spreadsheet models to prepare the 
simulation inputs” (Department of the Navy, 2007, p. 27). The performance, loading, 
transport, and transport plan models were run for a baseline major combat operation (MCO) 
MEB scenario. The initial capabilities document (ICD) . 
identified two broad categories of materiel solutions: air cushion vehicles 
(ACV) and wheeled/tracked displacement craft (DC). The ACV [not to be 
confused with amphibious combat vehicle] solutions were the existing 
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), LCAC Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP), new procurement LCAC SLEP, and a new technology 
ACV. The DC alternatives were wheeled or tracked monohulls and a 
wheeled or tracked catamarans. (Department of the Navy, 2007, p. ES-1) 
This AoA has been heavily criticized due to unexplained or missing data, along with an 
entire portion that was information copied verbatim from a paragraph earlier in the report. 
One example of unsupported data is according to this AoA, aviation assets cannot lift 
“26%” to “28%” of a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (Department of the Navy, 2007, p. 
1). No evidence or explanation is provided for the numbers 26% and 28%. Similarly, it is 
difficult to understand just what the AoA is talking about when it says, “86% of the 2015 
MEB sea-based maneuver echelon (SBME) surface task forces’ vehicles and equipment 
will need to be carried ashore via non-air (surface) assets for a STOM surface assault” 
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(Department of the Navy, 2007, p. 1). Why only 86%? And, why only surface assets, 
when much investment has been made in the CH-53K external lift capability? The AoA’s 
unsupported numbers and vague derivations make it a point of study in Advanced 
Combat Modeling at NPS. What this AoA does show, however, is that accurately 
depicting the complex nature of amphibious operations is very difficult. Spreadsheet tools 
and rounded percentages (e.g., 86%) deny decision makers the benefits of seeing things 
move and interact. Since the adversary is highly adaptive, so too must be the tools 
produced for decision makers.  
3. Exploring the Reduction of Fuel Consumption for Ship-to-Shore 
Connectors of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
Similar limitations are evident in recent research for evaluating fuel inefficiency 
in the wake of vehicle modifications. An SE capstone group leveraged a fictional Marine 
Corps Title 10 scenario, EW 12, set in Africa 2024, in order to provide traceable analysis 
for the E2O. This research benefitted from observing SE’s dedication of time and effort 
to work breakdown structure (WBS) and needs analysis. Nevertheless, according to 
Lieutenant Stephen “Jack” Skahen, United States Navy, Michael Boyett, Michael 
Brookhart, Steven Benner, and Josue Kure, since the adversary often lacks traditional 
warfighting methods compared to U.S. forces, technological inferiority has led nonpeer 
adversaries to adopt improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on the battlefield (Skahen,  
Benner, Boyett, Brookhart, & Kure, 2013, p. 2). Nevertheless injured and dead personnel 
“from IEDs in the theaters of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) increased, the amount of armor per vehicle and the number of vehicles 
required has grown, reducing the fuel efficiency and increasing the dimensions and 
weights of the vehicles that are deployed” (Skahen et al.,  2013, p. 32). ExtendSim 
discrete-event simulation revealed that “Seabase Distance and Sea State” impact mission 
time and fuel; moreover, that the Landing Craft Unit (LCU) “may be able to provide 
better fuel economy over employment of the LCAC” (Skahen et al., 2013, p. XXIV). 
Still, absent from this analysis are a closer look into distributed seabased operations 
across both vertical and surface means of STOM (e.g., STOM-vertically [STOM-V], over 
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the horizon [OTH], and by STOM-surface [STOM-S]), a self-deploying Marine 
amphibious combat vehicle, and, above all else, battle damage. 
4. Operational Energy/Operational Effectiveness Investigation for 
Scalable Marine Expeditionary Brigade Forces in Contingency 
Response Scenarios 
This study shifts the focus to evaluating fuel in an adversarial environment. 
“Operational Energy/Operational Effectiveness (OE2) Investigation for Scalable Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade Forces in Contingency Response Scenarios” is an NPS SE 
capstone report. The group of students that authored the capstone was called “Team 
Expeditionary” and their project focused on EW 12, Phase III of the Title 10 wargame. 
Phase III, EW 12, focuses on Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Previous 
capstone groups focused their studies on logistics and SSC, as seen with EW 12, Phase II, 
(Besser et al., 2013) and Phases I and II (Skahen et al., 2013). This thesis combines the 
collective efforts of operations research with these SE capstone projects, in order to 
provide an innovative tool for the future development of amphibious technology. After 
revisiting the stakeholder’s needs after the final project review (FPR), E2O expressed an 
interest in a broader agent based amphibious assault simulation. The FPR to E2O 
concluded that a principal finding of the capstone that rated further exploration was how 
platforms support JFEO from the seabase. Specifically, it was insightful to realize that 
variations in the number of platoons of Marines ashore has great effect in necessary 
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) fuel usage from 
energy drivers such as the MV-22 and CH-53K. STOM-V consists of rotor and tilt rotor 
aircraft. Figure 1 shows energy impacts for QRF and MEDEVAC operations for platoons 
of size three, four, and five, which are blue, red, and green, respectively. Powering up 
results like those shown in Figure 1 are integral to better understanding energy drivers in 
amphibious operations, which are larger than patrolling operations with platoons of size 
three, four, and five.  
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Figure 1.  QRF/Close Air Support (CAS) Insertion, MEDEVAC, and 
QRF/CAS Withdrawal for 3-Platoon, 4-Platoon, and 5-Platoon have 
higher Fuel Mission Use than Close Air Support, Logistics 
Resupply, and Ground Mission 
(from Team Expeditionary & Cohort 311-132, 2014). 
Jet Propellant 5 (JP-5) is the jet fuel used by U.S. Navy aircraft and SSC. The 
transition from legacy platforms to new aircraft has increased both capability and fuel 
consumption. For every upgrade in technology (e.g., MV-22 replaced the legacy CH-46 
for medium lift) there was a corresponding impact in fuel consumption. As a for instance, 
if there was a 300% increase in fuel consumption by the MV-22 from the CH-46—that 
the MV-22 is 300% more capable conducting medium lift missions. Nevertheless, the 
preponderance of Marine assets regularly being deployed is part of the Aviation Combat 
Element (ACE), which is the air component of the MEU. Exploring both split operations 
and disaggregate operations is a direct result and continuation of this December 2014 
capstone project. Further examination of fuel usage effect on QRF and MEDEVAC 
operations by prepositioning ACE forces and cross decking air assets to other air-capable 
ships in the seabase links this thesis to the capstone project. Increased analytics will 
further the work and time invested in the research requested by E2O. 
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B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MARINE CORPS SCALABILITY 
AND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT 
There is one tactical principal which is not subject to change. It is to use 
the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and 
destruction on the enemy in the minimum amount of time. 
Gen. George S. Patton 
Speech to the Third Army (1944) 
 
The complex Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) or Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle is designed to take Marines from Navy ships to the objective. The hope 
is to finally replace the legacy AAV-7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle, which provides 
neither the armor nor speed required today. Unfortunately, cost overruns contributed to 
the cancellation of the EFV in 2011. According to an Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) columnist, Robert N. Charette, “the Pentagon now spends 
about $21.6 million every hour to procure new military systems. As the cost and 
complexity of defense acquisitions programs continue to spiral out of control, many 
defense experts believe runaway military spending is unsustainable” (Charette, 2008, p. 
1). The Marine Corps needs an affordable tool to help determine the right mixture of 
ship-to-shore connectors and amphibious personnel carriers to conduct JFEO. 
1. The Environment 
In 2014, the nation and the Department of Defense (DOD) felt the impacts of 
sequestration. DOD acquisitions system for products and services can always do better, 
since “soldiers in the field are being denied much-need equipment, while civilian 
programs go unfunded” (Charette, 2008, p. 1). There are impacts from sequestration; 
among them, it blocks the armed forces’ ability to modernize through new programs. 
Often such delays can further impact program budgets, creating unforeseen costs. With 
most government contracts, once the contract has been awarded the DOD starts paying 
even if the government elects to shut down. The DOD acquisitions environment is further 
complicated as the “tide of war is receding” (Obama, 2011, p. 2) in the Middle East and 
the emphasis shifts to Asia and the Pacific. Put simply, war-driven, urgent requirements 
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will be less and less (e.g., Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected [MRAP] vehicles needed 
due to IEDs) and the products and services procured during the pivot to the Pacific will 
be done in a fiscally constrained economy. Nevertheless, the challenge facing decision 
makers is achieving a better fighting force that balances force modernization, 
sustainment, force structure. A first steps towards addressing this challenge is leadership 
communicating their policy objectives. The Marine Corps has taken the lead to this end. 
Then Commandant General James Amos signed the capstone document for the twenty-
first century USMC: Expeditionary Force 21 (EF-21). It provides direction. With this 
policy, the USMC will hopefully make better investments in the right capability. In his 
article, Dr. Axe highlights a consequence that “After an investment of 15 years and $17 
billion, today the Army is still struggling to build better radios and estimates it may need 
to spend another $12 billion to get what it needs” (Axe, 2012, p. 1). Detailed Marine 
Corps policy and data-driven decisions from inexpensive simulation tools will provide 
insights in how to achieve powerful, future warfighting equipment. 
2. Marine Corps Background 
The Marines have landed and the situation is well in hand. 
—Attributed to Richard Harding Davis (1864-1916) 
First American correspondent to cover the Spanish-
American War and the First World War 
  
This section covers a top-down look at the Marine Corps Title 10 obligation, 
namely to have an amphibious operations capability. 
a. United States Marine Corps 
The USMC is the United States’ force-in-readiness. Required readings for all 
Marines are capstone publications like EF-21, called the Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publications (MCDPs). MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations, describes the naval and 
expeditionary character of Marine forces (Department of the Navy, 1998). During the 
past 13 years, while Marines focused primarily on MCO in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
concurrent amphibious operations took place aboard amphibious ships. Marines embark 
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aboard Navy ships and sail around the world, training host nations and supporting crisis 
response (CR), as they have done so often in their past. While the concept of a tailorable, 
scalable MAGTF may be new—the importance of being expeditionary is rooted in 
numerous historical examples. Furthermore, being expeditionary is key to the existence of 
and the why for having a Marine Corps, which includes operational maneuver from the 
sea (OMFTS). OMFTS and the means to get Marines ashore support “As a global power 
with global interests, the United States must maintain the credible capability to project 
military force into any region of the world in support of those interests. This includes the 
ability to project force both into the global commons to ensure their use and into foreign 
territory as required” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 2). The Marines Corps brings with it a litany of 
experience in amphibious operations. To name a few, Marines were embarked with the 
Continental Navy during the American Revolution; crossed the Gulf of Mexico during 
the Mexican-American War; and fought at the Battle of Hampton Roads during the Civil 
War, in both Europe and the Pacific during World War II, in Korea, in the Cold War, and 
most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan (Symonds, 1995). Less known instances where 
Marines have answered the “amphibious” call are Lebanon (1958), post Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans (2005), and during relief in Haiti (2010). Marines enjoy centuries 
of lessons learned and over a decade of recent wartime experience that can be applied in 
their next expeditionary amphibious operation. 
b. Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
Historically, the Marine Corps leverages a combination of embarked air and 
ground forces in sourcing amphibious operations. A MEB is the second largest MAGTF 
of approximately 15,000 Marines and Sailors. Its comprised of the four elements ground, 
logistics, air, and headquarters. All can vary in size to meet the commander’s needs. 
Nominally it includes a reinforced infantry regiment, a Marine aircraft group, a combat 
logistics regiment, and a command group (Trickey, Benbow, & Taylor, 2010). There are 
three MEBs: the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigades based in California, 
North Carolina, and Japan, respectively. Recent operations such as Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, with Task Force Tarawa, and Operation Enduring Freedom, with Task Force 
Leatherneck, called upon Marines from 2nd MEB and 1st MEBs as part of the initial 
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invasions. The MEB construct has a purpose, as the scalable nature of MEBs is well-
suited for addressing weak/failed states and asymmetric threat environments. While a full 
MEB may be used for MCO, and may first need to be embarked as part of an 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), smaller elements (e.g., 2,000 Marines) regularly 
deploy as part of six-month rotations, as required. As the Marine Corps transitions away 
from land warfare and conducts increased amphibious operations, a smaller force that can 
scale up to an MEB and can regularly deploy is required. This force already exists and it 
is called a MEU. 
c. Marine Expeditionary Unit 
The Marine Corps routinely projects power from the sea through forward-
deployed MEUs; the principal component of the MEB. The battalion landing team (BLT) 
Marines and MEU supports the introduction of follow-on forces and can support special 
operations. The MEU is cyclical, expeditionary, self-sustaining, and able to complete a 
myriad of missions from the MEU Mission Essential Tasks (METs). MEUs often 
complete a certification period, i.e., a certification exercise (CERTEX), which enables 
them to demonstrate MET capabilities in completing a range of military operations 
(ROMO). For example, an MEU conducts numerous visit, board, search, and seizure 
(VBSS) and long-range raid training missions prior to attempting real-world VBSS or 
HA/DR operations. These “work-up” periods are six months long, providing the ACE, 
Ground Combat Element (GCE), and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with 
opportunities to combine and train to full operational capability (FOC). The MEU is to 
the MEB what the ARG is to the ESG: a smaller component of modular construct that 
enables tailorable force structure from the sea. To support the rotation, there are seven 
MEUs: three on the East Coast, three on the West Coast, and one in Japan. Additionally, 
two Special Purpose MAGTF-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) bases, in Spain and 
Africa, provide persistent forces close to areas of uncertainty, which may be reinforced 
and called on to support the modular nature of Marine expeditionary operations. The 
SPMAGTF-CR, however, does not project power from sea bases. Nevertheless, the MEU 
is capable of conducting OMFTS form surface and vertical sea based means deployed 
today. 
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d. Sea Bases 
A2/AD compels expeditionary bases and sites, namely sea-basing, in order to 
support maneuver warfare and logistics. Before cyber operations, amphibious operations 
were unique in that they occurred on the sea, land, and in the air. With so many unique 
capabilities (AAV, ACV, MV-22, F-35B, etc.) the MEU commander has a tough decision 
given the limited capacity aboard ships. Rarely will MEUs deploy configured the same, 
meanwhile “Forward-deployed ATFs are normally organized into ARGs with three 
amphibious warfare ships (an amphibious assault ship [general purpose] 
[LHA]/amphibious assault ship [multipurpose] [LHD], amphibious transport dock [LPD], 
and dock landing ship [LSD])” (Department of Defense, 1992, II-6). Similarly, there are 
limitations with well deck and flight deck capacity (with the exception of LHA-6 and 
LHA-7), as to how it embarks, deploys, and launches tilt-rotor aircraft, helicopters, 
landing craft, amphibious vehicles, etc. (USMC Amphibious Operations, 2014). The 
“amphib” has two variants: 
The LHD and LHA each has a full length flight deck and hangar to 
support helicopter, tiltrotor, and vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft 
[e.g., F-35B]. Well decks provide for ship-to-shore movement of landing 
craft and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs). The Commander 
Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander, Landing Force (CLF) 
and their staffs are normally embarked on these ships. (Department of 
Defense, 1992, II-6) 
The sea base allows for landing area selection. While the United States has invested in 
capital ships, adaptive adversaries have developed coastal missile defense systems, which 
make it no longer tactically prudent to park warships offshore. 
e. Distributed and Split Operations 
ARG/MEU employment does not restrict commanders to keeping the three ships 
in a close, tight formation. Thus, ARG shipping may consider a wide formation and the 
MEU commander may elect to spread detachments of Marines across several ships, thus 
splitting up the force. The split or disaggregated manner increases the flexibility, 
capability, and scope of the MEU. Split operations are generally closer than 
disaggregated operations. For example, “After completing a rigorous six month work-up 
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cycle, the 15th MEU set sail for its western pacific deployment May 2010, during which 
time the 15th MEU conducted numerous operations and exercises in dozens of countries” 
(15th Marine Expeditionary Unit [MEU], 2012, p. 1) During this deployment, the “15th 
MEU’s Force Recon Platoon executed the first opposed VBSS mission in Marine Corps 
history in 100 years aboard a captured vessel, and rescued the crew without one shot 
being fired” (15th MEU History, 2012, p. 1). Concurrently, the LHD responded to 
“torrential rains [that] ravaged Pakistan and caused major flooding…to conduct 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief. While operations were conducted in Pakistan, the 15th 
MEU also provided air support to OEF in Afghanistan. The 15th MEU Harriers 
conducted over 300 close air support sorties from August until October” (15th MEU 
History, 2012, p. 1). Spreading the ACE and GCE force across several ships reduces the 
risk of losing the whole MEU if a single ship is destroyed. Splitting the ACE among the 
LHD and LPD, which are both air-capable ships, also decreases the density of aircraft on 
the flight deck. 
f. Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
OMFTS combines the strengths of maneuver and surprise against the adversary. 
In 2001, the  
Marines and Sailors of the 15th MEU, special operations capable (SOC), 
conducted an amphibious assault over 400 miles into the land-locked country of 
Afghanistan . . . and set new standards for Marine Corps amphibious doctrine. 
Landing at a remote airbase, 90 miles southwest of Kandahar, the Marines 
established Camp Rhino, America’s first Forward Operating Base while 
maintaining the first significant conventional ground presence in Afghanistan. 
(15th MEU History, 2012, p. 1) 
Operational maneuver is the “marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare” 
(U.S. Marine Corps., 1998, p. 28). The adversary has to decide how and where it will 
defend its shore. Seldom does the BLT ever really concern themselves with where, 
resolving that leadership will pick the right location away from the adversary. Figure 2 
shows an AAV launching from the well deck of the “amphib.” 
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Figure 2.  An AAV debarking from an amphibious assault ship USS Bataan 
(LHD-5). AAVs in operation today are over 40 years old (from 
Eckstein, 2015).  
Advancements in technology, similar to the one seen in Figure 2 from so many 
years ago, allow both the adversary and the seabase to cover more ground. This poses 
new questions: What does it mean to be beachable? What does it mean to be amphibious? 
And, what connects the ship effectively to the shore? Types of connectors include the 
Maritime Landing Platform (MLP), Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), LCAC, UHAC, 
and LCU, to name a few.  
g. Amphibious Assault 
Taking Seoul during the Korean War in 1950 is an example of OMFTS. 
Amphibious assault, however, implies an opposed landing. Ideally, the MEU CATF 
would like to conduct an unopposed amphibious landing quickly from OTH. As the LF 
presses inland, “from naval warfare . . . the advantages inherent in sea-borne movement, 
and the flexibility provided by sea-based logistics” would fuel and supply the forward 
line of troops (FLOT) all the way to the objective (OMFTS MCDP, 2001, p. 28). How far 
Marines can conduct vertical amphibious landings has changed with the advent of 
extended reach from the MV-22. Increased concerns from IEDs and mines have caused 
 19 
unease with the legacy tracked AAV that is currently in use. Nevertheless, the AAV 
remains a practical means for bringing troops and equipment ashore. The AAV lacks the 
mobility and armor required for today’s amphibious operations. Several solutions to the 
legacy AAV include an upgrade to the AAV, which is affordable given the state of current 
technology. In DOD acquisitions, technology readiness level (TRL) or procuring a system 
incrementally might increase the likelihood of getting the right product to the warfighter. 
There are four ACV prototypes in production. Unlike the acquisitions approach used with 
the EFV, the ACV will take an incremental approach, where ACV 1.0 will have different 
capability than 2.0. The primary difference between the two ACVs is the 1.0 variant will 
have to ride in an SSC, while the ACV 2.0 will be autonomous. Specifically, the ACV will 
build on basic shore-to-shore mobility that works well when crossing ravines and canals, as 
seen in Iraq. Thereafter, ACV 2.0 represents a self-deploying, ship-to-shore capability, 
which is similar to that achieved by the EFV. Figure 3 shows Assault Amphibian 
Modernization out to 2034. Figure 3 projects that approximately 700 ACVs, totaling six 
amphibious assault companies, are to be procured to replace the legacy AAV. Meanwhile, 
approximately 392 AAVs will receive an upgrade. 
 
Figure 3.  Assault Amphibian Modernization projections from 2014 to 2034. 
Approximately 700 ACVs (wheeled, bottom right), totaling six 
companies, are to be procured to replace the bulk of the legacy AAV 
(tracked, upper left). Nearly 400 of the AAVs are to receive an 
upgrade (from LaGrone, 2015).  
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At present, decision makers heavily favor force protection (or armor) and speed. 
The future ACV procurement is rapidly approaching. The advent of the ACV, increased 
cost consciousness, and the desire for data driven decisions all make this research timely. 
The next amphibious procurement will play a critical role in successful amphibious 
assault missions for decades. 
The ACV is still early in the defense acquisitions system. Procurement will 
depend heavily on MOPs. These MOPs are likely to reflect those ranges seen in the initial 
operating capability (IOC) briefed to Congress by the military ground forces specialist 
Andrew Feickert regarding the ACV: 
 The proposed vehicle must be able to self-deploy from amphibious 
shipping and deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 Marines) from 
a launch distance at or beyond 12 miles with a speed of not less than 8 
knots in seas with 1-foot significant wave height and must be able to 
operate in seas up to 3-foot significant wave height. 
 The vehicle must be able to maneuver with the mechanized task force for 
sustained operations ashore in all types of terrain. The vehicle’s road and 
cross-country speed as well as its range should be greater than or equal to 
the M1A1 [42-45mph]. 
 The vehicle’s protection characteristics should be able to protect against 
direct and indirect fire and mines and IED threats. 
 The vehicle should be able to accommodate command and control (C2) 
systems that permit it to operate both at sea and on land. The vehicle, at a 
minimum, should have a stabilized machine gun in order to engage enemy 
infantry and light vehicles (Feickert, 2014, p. 3). 
What Figure 3, the Marine Corp’s Assault Amphibian Modernization, does not 
show, is that operations and support for the ACV will extend well beyond 2034. The 
expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and its Title 10 requirement to conduct 
operations from ships at sea inland, drives the development of technologies that 
seamlessly get Marines ashore. The complex nature of amphibious operations means the 
ACV should be designed to handle humanitarian operations all the way to forcible entry 
operations. 
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III. EW 12 SCENARIO AND MANA MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Modern threats call for the integrated application of naval capabilities in 
the maritime domain and beyond. 
—Expeditionary Warrior 2012 
 
This chapter begins with a general overview of EW 12 and the modeling software 
selected, MANA. Additionally covered are the benefits of MANA, which include why 
MANA’s intuitive interface is so useful to DOD decision makers, as well as its 
limitations. Last, we review the research questions, and describe the MANA modeling, 
including particulars of the major agent types. 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
The A2/AD scenario used in EW 12 is set in fictional 2024 West Africa. The 
adversary is comprised of both conventional and nonconventional forces in Savanna, 
Africa. The threat scenario is further complicated by instability created by a weak host 
nation. The Free Savanna Movement (FSM), and a neighboring invasion from the West 
African Federation (WAF), have prompted a U.S.-led coalition (Wargaming Division, 
2012). Figure 4 shows the enemy force composition and strength in opposition of 
Combined Joint Task Force Savanna (CJTF-Savanna). Adversary assessments concur 
with Figure 4, suggesting First Corp (I Corp) is moving northwest to the vicinity of 
Dakar, Savanna. Accordingly, CJTF-Savanna desires an amphibious operation south, 
near Barra, which strategically oversees the Gambie River.   
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Figure 4.  Enemy ground threat situation (from Wargaming Division, 2012). 
The baseline scenario follows the vignette structure of EW 12, and specifically 
this research explores an amphibious landing and subsequent battle once Phase I is 
complete. Phase I occurs after both maritime and air superiority have been achieved, 
which set the conditions for entry operations into Savanna. This research looks at a BLT 
reinforced by the MEU/MEB during Phase II, “Gain Entry.” The CJTF’s JFEO 
capabilities are to secure the city, support expansion of air points of debarkation 
(APODs), and sea points of debarkation (SPODs) (Wargaming Division, 2012). CJTF-
Savanna agrees to conduct an amphibious assault due to the combinations of urban 
terrain, conventional, and nonconventional forces in Savanna.  
The ARG has maneuvered to a position off the coast just OTH at 25 nm. The 
ARG has the full strength of the aviation and surface connectors of the MEU. The ACE is 
postured to provide STOM-V with MV-22s. Meanwhile four SSCs must bring waves 
ACVs, M1A1 tanks, combined anti-armor teams (CAATs), mobile howitzers, and 
infantry ashore. SSC or LCAC payload of ACV, M1A1, etc., waves can either be 
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accompanied by AAVs or a heliborne raid. In our modeling, we explore four scenarios to 
support the bringing of equipment ashore: 
LCAC (ACV): unaccompanied 
LCAC (ACV) + AAV: accompanied on wave one by AAV 
LCAC (ACV) + MV-22: accompanied by a heliborne raid of MV-22 
LCAC (ACV) + AAV + MV-22: accompanied on wave one by AAV and by a 
heliborne raid of MV-22 
Figure 5 shows the CJTF Concept of Operations (CONOP), Phases I-III. Phase II 
uses elements of the amphibious task force (ATF) to seize CJTF objective 4. 
 
Figure 5.  CJTF CONOP, Phases I-III (from Wargaming Division, 2012). 
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The mission of CJTF-Savanna is to conduct Operation RESTORE 
SOVEREIGNTY to re-establish the territorial integrity of Savanna, neutralize the WAF’s 
offensive capability, and transition security responsibilities to United Nations (U.N.) 
forces (Wargaming Division, 2012). 
B. MANA 
1. What is MANA? 
This research uses Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata Version V or “MANA” 
software, which was deemed suitable for modeling amphibious assault. MANA was 
deemed suitable for this effort because it was designed for use as a scenario-exploring 
model that is capable of addressing a broad range of problems (McIntosh, Galligan, 
Anderson, & Lauren, 2007). MANA is an agent-based model that can be used to simulate 
combat behavior. It allows the user to create a simulated complex adaptive system for 
important real-world elements of combat, including change of plans due to the evolving 
battle, the influence of situational awareness when deciding an action, and the importance 
of sensors (McIntosh et al., 2007). 
2. Benefits of MANA 
MANA software is fit for modeling amphibious assault because it allows for the 
creation of heterogeneous agent types, and is stochastic, which allows for capturing 
uncertainty and running the simulation multiple times using different random seeds to 
understand the effect of that uncertainty. MANA also gives the user: 
 An ability to watch the simulation with adequate detail and visual icons 
 An intuitive interface 
 Agent-based interactions derived from their goals and objectives, the 
environment, and sensor and weapon performance 
 And, an ability to be run in batch mode, over a variety of parameter 
settings  
Another advantage of MANA is that it can take as input a particular seed, and this 
provides repeatability. Seed here is an initial value used by the pseudo-random number 
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generator to create stochastic behavior in MANA. With a large number of parameters that 
can be varied, a stochastic model like MANA can represent a range of military operations 
(ROMO) and threat levels with a single model structure and a good design of experiment.  
3. MANA: Limitations and Assumptions 
These next two sections cover limitations and assumptions made in MANA. The 
primary limitation of MANA related to this research is that agents may one 
debuss/emboss one set of children. The main assumption made in MANA is logistics was 
not explicitly modeled. 
a. Limitations of MANA 
The versatility of MANA is that there are many options and settings that one can 
use to create the desired behaviors. Deciding on the right amount of detail, however, for 
each parameter is a fine balance, and in some cases MANA may not be able to handle the 
level of detail desired for a specific feature. MANA models a force’s aggregated ability 
to move through terrain. Details of individual Marines navigating obstacles—such as the 
beach-like stakes, barbed wire, and hedgehogs they encountered at Normandy—are not 
modeled. Below is a summary of the limitations of MANA, with regard to modeling 
amphibious assault: 
 Sensors and weapons performance is modeled relatively simply, with 
range-probability pairs and concealment parameters, for example. The 
model does not attempt to explicitly incorporate aspects of the 
environment such as sea state, weather, etc. MANA includes only enough 
“physics” as is necessary (McIntosh, 2009, p. 2). 
 The parameters for armor protection and penetration are simple. 
 Computation cost increases quickly with detail. 
 Agents may only debuss/embuss one set of ‘children.’ That is, LCACs 
cannot bring one wave of children (say howitzers) to the beach, then 
acquire another set of children (say infantry) back at the ship. To 
overcome this limitation, a separate LCAC agent was substantiated for 
every wave. 
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b. Assumptions Made in MANA 
Other simplifications are made because the operational metamodels that results from 
MANA excursions will eventually be linked with other software tools: 
 Fuel consumption—Fuel burn is not modeled in MANA. As seen in 
Chapter II, the USMC has VBA spreadsheet tools to calculate fuel burn. 
 Flight deck cycle—Deck cycle is not modeled in MANA. ACE is modeled 
via a DES in Simio.  
 Logistics—Resupply of fuel, ammunition, water, etc., is not modeled in 
MANA. Chapter II describes models that support logistical resupply. 
 Civilians—Neutrals or civilians also not modeled, as their impact to the 
MOP for different force configurations was deemed immaterial. 
 Beach conditions, sea state, weather, and elevation are not explicitly 
modeled. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research shows the value of conducting large-scale design and analysis of 
experiments with MANA. Meanwhile, since this research deals with specifications for 
concept ACV and SSC, we seek to address the following questions: 
 What are the ACV MOPs that positively contribute to the MOEs? 
 What are the SSC MOPs that positively contribute to the MOEs? 
Additionally, addressed in this section are EW 12 particulars which are applicable 
to the operational scenario, and how those were implemented in MANA. We also provide 
further details about the MANA implementation such as characteristics of the agents and 
the playboard (simulated battlefield). 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
One purpose of the simulation in this research is to provide a tool to influence the 
future development and procurement of the ACV and SSC. To do this we explore several 
MOEs: 
 MOE (1): Blue casualties 
 MOE (2): Red casualties 
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 MOE (3): Time to attrite the Red Force to 1/3 remaining strength 
 MOE (4): Force exchange ratio (FER), which is calculated for each run as  
(Red casualties +1) / (Blue casualties +1) 
E. SCENARIOS 
This research models a BLT-sized amphibious assault conducted four different 
ways by a MEU while embarked on the ARG, as described in Chapter II. This section 
presents the four scenarios modeled in this research. Subsequent sections present detailed 
modeling particulars, as well as details on friendly and adversary agents in MANA. 
1. Baseline Scenario (Scenario One) 
This scenario is based on the adversaries FSM and WAF. Pockets of adversary 
appear to be blending in with the local populace in the surrounding urban areas. A 
moderate force is believed to be guarding against a likely amphibious assault operation; 
however, they are unwilling to present overt defenses for fear of being targeted by CJTF 
air strikes. There are groups of adversary inland, with few willing to risk exposure by 
defending the coast. The enemy has 18 Red infantry, four Red medium/heavy artillery, 
two Red tanks, and four Red anti-tank teams. The adversary has anticipated U.S. 
involvement and believes that an urban avenue of approach is less likely than the landing 
force seeking an envelopment of the city from the north. Enemy activity has been low so 
an LCAC payload of ACV, M1A1, etc., unaccompanied on wave one is used to capitalize 
on the shore-to-shore mobility and force protection afforded by the wheeled ACV. Figure 




Figure 6.  Four LCACs or SSCs “+” returning to the seabase after bringing 
Blue ashore. 
2. Scenario Two 
This scenario combines the baseline with AAVs. It is more likely than the 
baseline scenario with LCACs operating alone. The MEU’s BLT will provide the landing 
force for the ship-to-shore movement. As the LCACs bring waves of personnel and 
equipment ashore, the CJTF employs self-deploying AAVs on wave one. The AAVs 
remain in their approach lanes and accompany the LCACs on wave one, pressing inland 
to establish security while friendly forces clear the landing beach. Once tactical integrity 
and force consolidation are complete, the force continues with assault operations. Figure 
7 shows four LCAC SSCs loaded with ACVs, M1A1 tanks, and equipment accompanied 
by AAVs on wave one.  
 29 
 
Figure 7.  Four SSCs, capable of 4xACV or 1xM1A1 “LCAC loads.” The 
MANA icon used for the LCAC is “+,” during a wave ashore, this 
icon will be overlayed by numerous icons of ACVs, M1A1 tanks, 
and equipment. Wave one is accompanied by AAVs. 
3. Scenario Three 
This scenario combines the baseline with a MV-22 helicopter-borne raid inland. 
Also known as STOM-V, this form of air assault with tilt rotor aircraft require an Area of 
Responsibility (AoR) that does not have prohibitive air defense artillery (ADA) to rotary 
wing operations. The CATF benefits from the deep insert afforded by tiltrotor aircraft, 
which supports his overall scheme of maneuver (SOM). The CATF LCAC payload of 
ACVs, M1A1s, etc., accompanied on wave one by tiltrotor aircraft, provide enhanced 
littoral maneuver and a range of options for the landing force (Department of Defense, 
1992). Figure 8 shows the heliborne raid of MV-22 aircraft from the seabase.  
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Figure 8.  Heliborne raid of MV-22 aircraft from the seabase. 
4. Scenario Four 
This scenario combines AAV and MV-22 joint operations. The LCAC payload of 
ACVs, M1A1s, etc., is accompanied on wave one by AAVs and MV-22s. In this STOM-
V and STOM-S amphibious assault the landing force (LF) takes advantage of additional 
amphibian firepower and the range of tiltrotor insertion. The two forces then transition 
from swimming and flying insertion forces to an on-land maneuver force (Department of 
Defense, 1992). Figure 9 shows the combination of both a heliborne raid and AAV. The 
necessary service craft deliver the ACVs, M1A1 tanks, and equipment ashore with an 
accompaniment of AAVs on wave one. 
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Figure 9.  Heliborne raid and wave one supported by AAVs. 
F. MODELING PARTICULARS 
In this section, we provide further details on how terrain was modeled, as well as 
the force build-up ashore and the FLOT, all of which are vital to the CATF as discussed 
in Chapter II. 
1. Theater of War—The Sea, Surf, Shore, and Land 
This MANA battlefield configuration has a global map size that is 70 nm by 70 
nm. One time step in the model is equal to five seconds. Red and Blue agents on the 
battlefield are organized into groups called “squads” and are limited by both terrain and 
organic sensor capabilities, which together determine and what they can “see.” Maneuver 
and placement of squads are relative to an X-Y Cartesian grid. An offshore area to the 
southwest supports offshore distances of 25 nm.  
Three types of maps form separate layers that make up the battlefield: 
Background, Terrain, and Elevation. The background map is detailed imagery of the 
theater of war, which is commonly satellite imagery of the AoR; it does not impact the 
model computations, it simply serves as a background visual for the user. Meanwhile, 
both the terrain and elevation maps do impact model calculations. MANA uses a 
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Windows bitmap file to define terrain, and each pixel is assigned distinct RGB (red, 
green, and blue) color settings (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007). 
Additionally, each terrain type (color) is assigned a value of “going” (how well the pixel 
can be traversed), “cover” (how much protection from fire the pixel provides), and 
“concealment” (how much protection from sight the pixel provides); going, cover, and 
concealment values range from 0.0 to 1.0. Figure 10 shows the RGB colors and going, 
cover, and concealment properties for the terrain used in this scenario. 
 
Figure 10.  Terrain map, including the red, green, and blue (RGB) colors with 
dark green shown at right. 
In MANA, the scenario editor enables the design of custom terrain not present in 
the defaults. An example of a default terrain is a road, which is colored with a particular 
color of yellow. The terrain features used in the model are light brush, sand, heavy brush, 
water, road, and building structure. Figure 10 shows that the road, which is colored with 
(255, 255, 0) “yellow,” offers neither cover nor concealment, but perfect going.  
Initial runs and variations were performed, and insights from these runs helped to 
shape the baseline scenario. A killer-victim scoreboard Excel macro was used to explore 
the results. These initial runs revealed the importance of massing combat power ashore 
prior to assaulting through the objective. When squads arrived and continued to the 
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objective without waiting for the remaining components of the ATF, the lead elements 
were destroyed. Initial replications also revealed the value of urban terrain. When the 
terrain was turned off, the ATF was more vulnerable to the adversary’s artillery. 
The ability to use “trigger states” in MANA is useful for specifying behaviors that 
should occur when certain conditions were achieved. For example, in order to achieve 
mass, agents in their default state release from their SSC and proceed to a predetermined 
waypoint, and upon reaching that waypoint, their state changes to Reach Waypoint, and 
in this state they wait until the rest of the force has landed ashore. Debarking agents from 
SSCs continue to arrive, transition inland, and wait for the final wave of the ATF. This 
reached waypoint state can be observed by the agent icon changing from its default blue 
to pink. Once the final wave arrives, a symbolic ‘refueling’ interaction is performed, 
which then triggers the entire landing force to move. Figure 11 shows the final wave 
arriving, disembarking, and changing their state. 
 
Figure 11.  In order to mass force ashore prior to moving deeper into the threat 
environment, agents must press inland and establish security (pink). 
Agents next await the final wave. As the final wave arrives squad 




In this section, we provide a summary of the different agent types used in MANA. 
Table 1 provides an overview of all the agents created in MANA. From left to right it 
shows the agent, description, their allegiance or side, agent class, and threat level. Agent 
class and threat level can be used to specify sensor/weapon-target pairings. 
Table 1.   MANA Agent Classifications. 




Landing Helo dock, large air 
capable ship 1 99 3 
LPD 
Landing transport dock, L. 
platform/dock 1 99 3 
LSD Landing ship dock 1 99 3 
LCAC Landing Craft, Air Cushion 1 88 3 
AAV Assault Amphibious Vehicle 1 77 3 
MV22 Medium lift, Tiltrotor aircraft 1 66 3 
M1A1 Main battle Tank 1 2 3 
LAVGrp Light Armored Vehicle 1 4 2 
AntiTank CAAT or Anti-tank warfare team 1 5 2 
BlueHowit Short barrel mobile artillery 1 3 2 
Inf Four inf aggregated as a FT 1 1 1 
ACV ACV, wheeled 1 4 3 
Agent Description of Red Agent Allegiance 
Agent  
Class Threat 
RedInfant Four Red inf aggregated as a FT 2 1 1 
RedHowit Short barrel red mobile artillery 2 3 2 
RedTanks Red Main battle Tank 2 2 3 
RedAntiTank Red anti-tank warfare team 2 5 2 
There are 113 squads in the scenario file that may be activated or deactivated. 
Since a new squad assumes the squad number one higher than the last squad created, a 
deleted squad changes the squad numbers of subsequent agents. Therefore, once a squad 
is created it is helpful to keep it and just deactivate it in MANA so that squad numbers do 
not change (if, for example, you would have to make many changes to documentation if 
squad numbers changed). 
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a. Blue Agent Properties 
Table 2 contains further details for some of the Blue agents. The table contains 
squad numbers for individual tanks and ACVs, who their parent agent is, and the number 
of agents in the squad. Table 2 also contains agent class number and a run start delay. 
Run start delay is particularly useful when modeling agents that “come to life” and enter 
the scenario at different times. For example, the delays before a second, third, or fourth 
wave of LCACs launch. If an agent has a parent, then that agent is subject to its parent’s 
run start. The parent of a tank or ACV represents the LCAC that carries that entity 
ashore. More details are provided in Appendix A. 
Table 2.   This table shows the four M1A1 tanks and 19 ACVs modeled. The table 
also shows the LCAC squad number or parent agent that brings them 
ashore. For example, ACV-P-1, ACV-P-2, & ACV-P-3 and the Recovery 
ACV (squad 93, ACV-R-1) all have the same parent.  
Squad # Squad Parent # of Agents Agent Class # Run Start Delay 
34 M1A1-1 4 1 2 0 
35 M1A1-2 5 1 2 0 
36 M1A1-3 7 1 2 0 
37 M1A1-4 8 1 2 0 
76 ACV-P-1 6 1 4 0 
77 ACV-P-2 6 1 4 0 
78 ACV-P-3 6 1 4 0 
79 ACV-P-4 73 1 4 0 
80 ACV-P-5 73 1 4 0 
81 ACV-P-6 73 1 4 0 
82 ACV-P-7 75 1 4 0 
83 ACV-P-8 9 1 4 0 
84 ACV-P-9 9 1 4 0 
85 ACV-P-10 9 1 4 0 
86 ACV-P-11 74 1 4 0 
87 ACV-P-12 74 1 4 0 
88 ACV-P-13 74 1 4 0 
89 ACV-P-14 74 1 4 0 
90 ACV-P-15 12 1 4 0 
91 ACV-P-16 12 1 4 0 
92 ACV-P-17 75 1 4 0 
93 ACV-R-1 6 1 4 0 
94 ACV-C-1 73 1 4 0 
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Blue agents all have allegiance “1.” Table 2 shows a run start delay of zero for all 
of the squads listed here, because they are the children of LCAC agents. The agent class 
number allows entities to target and be targeted by appropriate types of agents. For 
example, infantry will target other infantry and CAAT, while CAAT will target both 
infantry and tanks. 
Placement of Red agents was in accordance with the EW 12 scenario. At the 
beginning of the simulation, the Blue agents are all located at the seabase. The operations 
from the MLP or seabase debuss SSCs, which then debuss ACVs by waves that swim to 
the shore. Later, at the objective, the ACV debusses its Blue infantry. Once Red classifies 
Blue targets, the Red forces engage. 
The subsequent sections provide additional detail regarding modeling of: 
 Seabase 
 SSC 
 AAV (self-deployer) 
 MV-22 






The ARG is the seabase modeled in this research. While the ARG is smaller than 
the ESG, these three ships are indicative of the capability sailing at any given point 
within the three operational MEUs. The model can easily be adapted to other forms of 
seabases since there are many options for the seabase. In many of the likely scenarios, the 
seabase is OTH, postured to support low signature SSC to deploy APCs, ACVs, and 
AAVs close to shore during one period of darkness. The modeled three vessels that 
comprise the ARG seabase have the properties discussed in Chapter II. The basic model 
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structure can be modified to incorporate MLP, which can bring more LCACs and the 
JHSV capable of offloading ACV offshore. The JHSV and MLP programs advertise 
increased maneuverability and speed. Figure 12 shows the LHD agent. Figure 12 depicts 
the MANA graphical user interface (GUI) screen for setting agent “personality,” and 
shows that the LHD in its default state has a personality weight of 50 toward its next 
waypoint. Note that all other personality weightings have been assigned a value of 0, 
ensuring that while in this state the LHD will only move towards its next waypoint and 
will not engage in other behaviors. 
 
Figure 12.  LHD Agent: Depicts the GUI for in MANA. The agent icon is 
located in the lower left, possible trigger states (e.g., Default State, 
Reach Final Waypoint) are in a column to the right.  
(2) Ship-to-Shore Connectors 
We chose to model the LCAC SSC because the service life extension program for 
the LCAC will continue its use through 2027, and it represents the current ARG 
capability. Furthermore, since LCACs presently serve as the Navy’s high speed 
connectors, they represent a worst case. An operation requiring multiple waves also 
represents a worst case. It is feasible that a JHSV or UHAC loaded with ACV could 
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deploy a much higher volume of ACV, but that was not a focus of this research. This 
research took care to model a more limited and yet practical scenario with three waves of, 
at most, four LCACs. If a JHSV or MLP is desired, an arrival of ACV at a certain time 
and location offshore is easier to model in MANA than what might be required to make a 
similar change in a coded model (e.g., VBA). Nevertheless, an LCAC can carry 
approximately 120,000 lbs at speeds of 40 kts in seas with waves heights of 4.1 to 8.2 
feet, averaging 6.2 feet (Department of the Navy, 2007). Figure 13 shows the three 
LCAC waves from the ARG. A total of four LCACs are selected, based on the new LHA 
and LPD configurations. 
 
Figure 13.  Baseline factor of four LCACs as the SSC. The bottom right square 
shows the fourth LCAC on the first wave loaded with four ACV. 
The squad number is 73 for that particular LCAC. One may alter the 
design features of these “black box LCAC” to upgrade this modeled 
agent capability to JHSV, UHAC, “Mike Boats” (LCM-8), LCU, 
concept LCAC, etc. 
Figure 13 also represents the future for this research. The “black box LCAC” can 
be configured to represent any possible future SSC. Modeled LCACs have the Run Start 
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trigger state enabled. The Run Start time includes a delay for loading and offloading 
vehicles and equipment. For each wave, a new set of LCAC agents are used. Chapter II 
described one benefit of amphibious ops is the attacker’s ability to determine the time and 
place. Modeling waves with run start delays is reasonable, as the mission is time-driven. 
Figure 14 shows a negative weighting towards friendlies, and the negative weight results 
in squads that are more dispersed on the battlefield (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & 
Lauren, 2007). Figure 14 also shows the Run Start trigger state in the far right column 
(font shaded green).  
 
Figure 14.  LCAC Agent: Depicts the Personalities GUI in MANA. The agent 
icon is located in the lower left, possible trigger states (e.g., Default 
State, Reach Waypoint, Reach Final Waypoint, Run Start) have a 
check in the box. The Run Start trigger state is unique to the LCAC, 
as their waves are based on time. 
(3) Amphibious Assault Vehicles  
The legacy AAV still deploys regularly with the MEU. Therefore, excursions 
using the BLT and AAVs are likely as ACVs are meant to serve as reinforcing echelons 
of a JFEO. Assuming that an MEU-sized force (BLT) would be first ashore; a question 
this research sought to answer was how the ACV as a shore-to-shore increment could be 
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more effective than the old AAV or previous increment. Nine AAVs were modeled for 
wave one, which was based on the number required for a company of lift. Shore-to-shore 
and ship-to-shore mobility were covered in Chapter II and represent the future life cycle 
of the ACV. The AAV was modeled to hold a reinforced infantry squad.  
The weapon for the AAV was modeled to represent a 0.50 cal machine gun. 
Speeds for the AAV ranged from swim speeds of eight knots to land speeds of 40 mph. A 
remote weapon station (RWS) was not considered, however, it could be implemented 
based on the considerations outlined for the ACV and upgrades intended for this 40 year-
old platform. The GUI in MANA for the AAV differs from the LCAC (Figure 14) only in 
that the agent icon located in the lower left is a Blue tracked APC. Possible trigger states 
(e.g., Default State, Reach Waypoint, Reach Final Waypoint, Run Start) remain the same 
as for the LCAC. This section covers the agent used to model an amphibian self-
deploying vehicle comparable to the AAV. However, it is also well suited to model the 
EFV, ACV 2.0 increment as TRL improves. 
(4) MV-22 
STOM-V provides rapid inland ranging and additional Marine FT lift capability, 
as required of scenario 3. The GUI in MANA for the MV-22 differs from the LCAC 
(Figure 14) only in that the agent icon located in the lower left is a Blue helicopter and 
dispersion is affected by a personality weight of –30 from other friends. The MV-22 has a 
7.62 millimeter (mm) gun aircraft unit and several crew served weapon systems. These 
options, such as a tail gunner, limit the altitudes at which they can fly. Modeled instead 
are the embussing behavior of 24 combated-loaded Marines on each MV-22. The speed, 
vulnerability, and range of the MV-22 are modeled—weapons and the deck cycle are not.  
(5) Amphibious Combat Vehicles 
Nineteen ACVs are modeled in this research: 17 normal ACVs (ACV-P[1-17]), a 
repair or towing variant, and communications variant. The ACV is the main Marine 
carrier or vehicle for this research. Two ACV can carry a reinforced Marine rifle squad 
and two days of supply. Since there are two ACV for what was one AAV, the ACV 
brings two RWS. The ACV may also be configured with a MK-19 grenade launcher, 
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which is not modeled, however, the RWS and increased armor is modeled—as compared 
to the legacy AAV. There are three crew members: the vehicle commander, a gunner, and 
a driver. A Marine company of lift requires 21 ACV. Two to four FTs per ACV cover the 
requirement that 10 to 15 Marines be onboard (8-16 Marines were modeled). The speed 
of the ACV allows it to keep up with the M1A1. The questions surrounding the ACV are 
ideal to explore with MANA. For example, armor, increased lethality in the RWS, and 
cross country speeds comparable with the M1A1 in A2/AD or degraded mobility, are all 
parameters that can be changed in MANA. Similarly, MANA supports the 
interoperability with connectors too. As mentioned previously, L-Class ships (e.g., LHD, 
LPD, etc.,) and MPF bring additional SSCs.  
Four trigger states were implemented in MANA to incorporate the complexity of 
amphibious operations. First, the Default State covers the swim from debussing from the 
LCAC to a safe location ashore at distances of 5, 12, 25 nautical miles (nm). Second, 
Reach Waypoint stops the ACV from advancing inland. Instead they establish security, 
awaiting the complete force buildup. Third, as previously described, Refueled By Friend 
occurs once the final wave arrives (because a member of that wave refuels friendlies). 
Fourth, Reach Final Waypoint dismounts infantry on or near the objective, upon reaching 
the final waypoint. Figure 15 shows the four trigger states that are active for all the 
ACVs. It also shows the agent icon, which is also that of the AAV. 
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Figure 15.  ACV agent: Depicts the GUI for in MANA. Trigger states used are 
the Default State, Reach Waypoint, Refuel By Friend, and Reach 
Final Waypoint. Run start is not required as the ACV are debussed 
from LCAC when the LCAC reaches its debark point. 
The next few screen shots show the ACV squad properties: 
 Tangibles tab: Shows movement speeds, threat, allegiance, and agent 
class information. 
 Sensors tab: Provides probabilistic detection and classification range 
information and target class prioritization.  
 Weapons tab: Shows round counts, reload time, maximum effective 
ranges, penetration, and probability of hit. 
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Figure 16.  ACV agent, tangibles shown are number of hits to kill, movement 
speed, allegiance, threat level, and agent class. 
 




Figure 18.  ACV agent, depicts weapon ranges, probability of hit, round count, 
reload time, target priority list.  
(6) M1A1 Abrams Tank 
The LF has four main battle tanks embarked on the MEU. LCAC modeled are 
only capable of waves of a single tank. The tank provides superior firepower and 
mobility. The tank, too, has gone through several series and upgrades. This thesis does 
not focus on this type of vehicle, save for the fact that many amphibious requirements are 
being based on keeping up with the M1A1’s cross-country speed of approximately 45 
mph. The M1A1 also has excellent armor. For modeling purposes, the tank’s armor and 
number of hits required to kill it, represent an upper bound for all agents. Yet, even the 
M1A1 is limited by target acquisition, that is, the ability to classify an enemy. One thing 
to keep in mind is that the tank’s 120 mm round has a higher logistical footprint, as 
compared to other ammunition, like that of the 0.50 cal. Therefore, if further excursions 
are run in MANA, the user may want to consider how to capture the additional logistical 
strain associated with longer battles and or increased battle intensity. 
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(7) Combined Anti-Armor Team 
The CAAT is unique in that it both has a personality weight to move toward an 
ideal enemy, and that it refuels friendly agents when it arrives last, for reasons previously 
described in Section C of this chapter (Figure 11). Figure 19 shows a positive personality 
weight to target its “ideal class,” Red tanks (which are agent class 2). This ensures that 
the CAAT will engage enemy armor units whenever possible. The modeled weapon is 
comparable with a tube-launched optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system. 
Modeling the TOW missile system provides a lower bound worst case as there are other 
tank missile systems (e.g., AGM-114, Spike, Javelin) that have higher probability of 
weapons release, probability of hit, and probability of damage given a hit, than the TOW. 
The CAAT have three rounds, with a delay in between attempts, but with good armor 
penetration. 
 
Figure 19.  CAAT agent called AntiTankTm1, represented in pink, has a 
personality weight to move toward Red tanks. Once released from 





Howitzers are not known for their mobility. The agent name preserves the 
purpose of this agent—long to medium range artillery. The expeditionary fire support 
system (EFSS) provides expeditionary fire support. While the right mix of mobile to 
fixed artillery is not the focus of the research, expeditionary artillery is part of the future 
concepts decision makers will be considering for EF-21. The structure of the model is not 
currently equipped to explore the impacts of the CH-53K requirement to be able to 
externally load the EFSS and its vehicle. However, this model can demonstrate the 
impacts of mobile artillery fire. 
(9) Infantry 
Infantry are loaded aboard the AAV, ACV, and MV-22. In MANA, all of the 
embussed infantry are secure in their APC until the infantry are debussed or dropped off 
at either the landing zone or the objective. That is because, in this model, there is no 
hostile resistance against the carriers. This could be changed in the future, if desired. 
Several methods can be employed to release infantry from their parent. The method used 
here is that the infantry are released upon the carrier reaching its objective. Dismounting 
infantry earlier exposes them to enemy fire, while dismounting later runs the risk of 
increased casualties if the entire vehicle is destroyed (e.g., from IED, artillery, etc.). A 
method of maintaining mass with the infantry is to preserve the FLOT until reaching the 
objective. Multiple waves in an amphibious assault and terrain make formulating a FLOT 
challenging. Terrain includes the surf, sand, and urban terrain from streets and structures.  
The AAV can hold a reinforced rifle sqaud. The ACV will hold less than a 
complete squad of Marines. A squad is 13 Marines, comprised of a squad leader and 
three FT of four Marines each. The FT concept is unique to the USMC and is designed to 
bring increased firepower on the enemy. Some argue that a weakness of the ACV is that 
it potentially splits up FTs and the squad between two vehicles. Since 2007, however,  
Marines have ridden in combat in a vehicle that holds a payload comparable to the ACV, 
specifically the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. APCs designed to 
withstand IEDs were vital for OIF and OEF. As seen in Chapter II, Marines anticipate 
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enountering mines during an amphibious assualt. The size of this vehicle is now familiar 
to Marines, and squads have been split up while riding in High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) for combat operations. 
b. Red Agent Properties 
This section covers modeling Red agents: 
 Tanks 




Chapter II describes the advantages of the defense and the complex terrain forged 
by the attacker prior to reaching the enemy during an amphibious assault. This chapter 
covers the enemy EW 12 scenario. FSM and WAF present both irregular warfare and 
conventional threats. In this analysis, we find that where Red lacks platforms of varying 
type, model, and series—Red accounts for this by having more resources, concealment, 
greater maximum effective range, and increased overall situational awareness. Figure 20 
shows Red’s force laydown. 
 
Figure 20.  Red tanks, anti-tank teams, ADA, and infantry. 
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(1) Red Tank 
There are two heavily armored and concealed tanks for Red. Both tanks have 
sensors that out-range Blue tanks by 1,000 meters (m). Red tanks also have better 
logistics; therefore, Red tanks enjoy higher round counts than Blue. Red tanks only have 
one state and move so as to avoid being decisively engaged. Red tanks are superior to 
Blue tanks to give the advantage to the defense and make it formidable. 
(2) Red Anti-Tank Team 
There are two well-trained anti-tank teams. These teams also enjoy better 
concealment and logistics than Blue. The anti-tank team has personal concealment per 
detection event equal to 50%, which means it has a 50% chance of not being acquired by 
Blue. For reference, a concealment value of 100% will give a Red anti-tank team agent a 
0% chance of being seen (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007). 
(3) Red Artillery, Air Defense Artillery 
The Red artillery has personal concealment per detection event equal to 70%, 
given the FSM’s ability to blend in with the local populace, or the WAF’s proclivity to 
nest their artillery near cities or in other areas that make targeting difficult. Red artillery 
also models the impact of air defense artillery, as Red artillery actually prioritizes Red 
aircraft above infantry and CAAT. 
(4) Red Infantry 
Red infantry enjoy some of the similar befits of the defense and basic 
characteristics of the scenario described. Like Red artillery, Red infantry are all 70% 
concealed. The Red force is massed or concentrated, which creates a formidable defense 
for Blue. Red is also organized with a layered defense, ranging Blue as they advance 
toward Red’s position. In MANA, every Red infantry requires 11 hits to be killed, 
meaning Red infantry is 11 times harder to kill than Blue. The number 11 is somewhat 




IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
This chapter covers the design of experiment; specifically, the choice of factors 
and levels, robust design, and design choice. Additionally, we discuss how the number of 
replications was determined, as well as how the experiment was executed. 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
Understanding the fundamentals of DOE is important. Without an adequate 
understanding, the experimenter risks wasting time and resources, and unnecessarily 
limiting the analysis that can be performed on the data. Our DOE considers four scenario 
types and 77 other factors. From the seabase, force masses ashore via one of the 
following configurations: Figure 21 shows the baseline scenario, scenario 1, is 
highlighted in white, with its major components listed in the schematic. 
 LCAC (ACV) 
 LCAC (ACV) + AAV 
 LCAC (ACV) + MV-22 
 LCAC (ACV) + AAV + MV-22 
 
Figure 21.  Experiment setup schematic, which shows the four scenarios and 
two other decision factors: (1) distance from shore that ACVs are 
deployed from the SSCs, and (2) the number of SSCs. 
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Figure 21 summarizes the four scenario alternatives. The bottom left corner of 
Figure 21 shows the seabase. The baseline/scenario 1 consists of LCACs completing no 
more than four waves, bringing ashore 17 ACVs, four M1A1s, and the supporting 
equipment. These waves are unaccompanied by legacy AAV or MV-22 support. 
Scenarios two and three build on this, bringing additional forces ashore either from 
STOM-S or STOM-V. The factor settings listed at the bottom of Figure 21 show that the 
ACVs may be launched to swim to shore from 5, 12, or 25 nm, and that 2, 3, or 4 LCACs 
are used to transport the ACVs.  
To build our efficient DOE for a MANA model, we conduct the following steps: 
1. Define decision and noise factors, and their levels/bounds 
2. Select the appropriate design 
3. Verify the design, ensuring space-filling and low correlation properties 
1. Factors and Ranges of Interest 
Factors of interest cover a broad range of possible parameters; inputs that were 
developed in both Chapters II and III. Factors can be either continuous or 
discrete/categorical. Tables 3 and 4 contain complete listings of all Blue and red factors, 
respectively. Both Table 3 and 4 show factors other than the scenario type, a brief 
description, their minimum (Min), current, and maximum (Max) values (if continuous) 
and their levels (if discrete or categorical). The following tables are colored red and blue, 
which is used to distinguish threat (if Red) and friendly (if Blue). Various data in the two 
Min and Max columns are highlighted in yellow to break out the continuous variables 
from the categorical. Since we can adjust these variables they are controllable factors, 
which will be explained in greater detail after the table.  
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Table 4.   Complete listing of Red experiment factors. 
 
 
a. Controllable Factors 
Factors in a design are classified as controllable if they can be controlled in the 
real world. Factors are uncontrollable if they are outside of the operator’s control. There 
are many controllable factors associated with an amphibious assault. Operators may 
select from a variety of platforms. Additionally, the numbers of ACVs, SSCs, and 
helicopters are all controllable factors. It should be noted that some factors in a design 
may require changes to the structure of the simulation, and we use a translation to handle 
mappings and dependencies. For example, Figure 22 is a schematic that shows how the 
simulation’s landing plan was adjusted to accommodate different numbers of LCACs. 
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Figure 22.  A schematic of how the simulation’s landing plan was adjusted to 
accommodate 2, 3, and 4 LCACs. 
b. Uncontrollable Factors 
In contrast to controllable factors, uncontrollable (or “noise”) factors are those 
that operators cannot control in the real world. In an amphibious assault, noise factors 
included wave height, wind velocity, and terrain. All of the rows colored in red in Table 3 
represent uncontrollable factors. Noise factors are important to consider when providing a 
robust solution that will work in many different situations. Often, scenario-based analysis 
becomes too dependent upon hordes of unrealistic assumptions. While this research 
leverages EW 12, it is important to provide a broad analysis that considers a range of 
noise factors, in order to generate a robust solution. Moreover, while waves, winds, and 
weather are important for a higher-resolution study of the physical environment, the noise 
factors in our experiment are associated with characteristics of the threat. With the threat 
factors, we cover a broad range of possibilities for how well the enemy can sense and 
prosecute the incoming Blue forces with firepower. 
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c. Robust Design 
Building the ACVs and SSCs will take time and cost a lot of money. The time and 
cost associated with running simulation experiments is much less than making changes 
on the real system, and can incorporate changes more quickly than upgrading the ACV. 
The robust design approach was forged by Toyota engineer and statistician Genichi 
Taguchi (1986). In the simulation context, the simulation is a surrogate for the real 
system, which may realize the benefits of improved performance and decreased cost 
faster than the manufactured system (Sanchez, 1994). With all the factors, inputs, and 
alternatives for a given system, we proceed with a design process akin to simulation 
optimization, where the “best” answer is not overly sensitive to small changes in the 
system’s inputs (Sanchez, 1994). Procured future equipment of the Navy and Marine 
Corps should be robust to a variety of missions and threats based on the approach above. 
Today, the adaptive adversary will change based upon technology; therefore, technology 
must be flexible enough to perform a variety of things well. 
B. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL AND BALANCED (NOB) MIXED DESIGNS 
In this research, 78 factors, including scenario type, were varied over several 
hundreds of thousands of simulated amphibious assaults. Here, we take a step back and 
discuss how efficiency, which is the number of design points required to study k factors 
with m levels each, can vary considerably across possible design types. For example, to 
study four factors with two levels each, using a full-factorial design that investigates 
every possible combination, would require 2
4
=16 design points. A full factorial design of 
four factors with four levels each would require 4
4
=256 design points. Increasing the 
number of factors and/or levels for a full factorial design causes the number of design 
points needed to increase exponentially, and this is referred to as the “curse of 
dimensionality.” A much more efficient design, developed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, is called the Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH). NOLH designs have 
good space-filling and orthogonality properties (Sanchez, Sanchez, & Wan, 2014). 
Figures 23c and 23d show a good example of the difference in coverage between factorial 
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and NOLH designs. Figure 23 shows a comparison of the pairwise projection plots for 
two factorial (if top row) and two NOLH designs (if bottom row). 
  
Figure 23.  The top row features factorial designs and the bottom row illustrates 
the near-orthogonality and space-filling properties of NOLH designs 
(from Sanchez, Sanchez, & Wan, 2014). 
The computational savings of the NOLH designs is enormous; but, the NOLH 
design is best suited for continuous factors. The inclusion of discrete or categorical 
factors can cause the pairwise correlations to increase, due to the rounding involved. 
Therefore, since our design contains several discrete factors, we use one of the new 
designs—the nearly orthogonal-and-balanced (NOB) mixed designs of Vieira, Jr., 
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Sanchez, Kienitz, and Belderrain (2011, 2012). For this research, the 512-design point, 
NOB design template, available at http://harvest.nps.edu, is used. Figure 24 contains an 
excerpt of the 512-design point, NOB design spreadsheet template. Additionally, the low 
and high values we see in this figure are the same as the maximum and minimum values 
we saw in Table 3. 
 
Figure 24.  An excerpt of the 512-design point, NOB design spreadsheet 
template, which allows for the investigation of the 77 factors. The 
template can handle simultaneous investigation of 300 factors, with 
discrete number levels and continuous-valued factors (after Sanchez, 
Sanchez, & Wan, 2014). 
As previously mentioned, not only are these designs space-filling, but they also 
produce the near-orthogonality desired for regression analysis. All pairwise correlations 
are less than 0.012 in our design. A color map of correlations can be used to visualize 
pairwise correlations, and is shown in Figure 25. The 77 red cubes connected along the 
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diagonal depict the perfect positive correlation (i.e., red = 1.0) between the factor and 
itself, while the remaining area is shaded grey, which shows a near-zero correlation 
between any factors that are not the same. Appendix G shows a multivariate plot for the 
complete design. 
 
Figure 25.  Color map of the design’s pairwise correlations. 
C. EXECUTING THE EXPERIMENT 
The NOB design spreadsheet provides 512 design points for the 77 factors (not 
including the scenario type). The design for the 77 factors was then crossed with the 
scenario type factor, yielding a total of 4 512 2,048   design points. EW 12, MEB 
concept of operations, and research covered in Chapters I and II were used to guide the 
selection of factors, ranges, and levels. For example, E2O provided many of the ranges 
for factors covered, as these values were deemed interesting to the stakeholder, based on 
key performance parameters and objective threshold values for systems being procured. 
Each design point was run using 30 different random seeds. We discuss the rationale for 
using 30 replications in Section D. 
The following section describes how the Simulation Experiments and Efficient 
Designs (SEED) Center configured and executed the DOE. The base case MANA 
scenario, in eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format, and the DOE file, in comma-
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separated value (CSV) format, were entered into a software program called XStudy, 
written by SEED Center Research Associate Steve Upton. XStudy enables the user to 
map each column in the design file to a specific parameter element in MANA, using 
XPaths. An XPath is a reference to a specific location in an xml file. Other details about 
the study design, such as the version of MANA and the number of replications per design 
point, are also entered into this tool, yielding a single “study.xml” file. This study file is 
used by another program called oldmcdata, also written by SEED Center Research 
Associate Steve Upton, which programmatically modifies the MANA XML file, 
producing a separate XML scenario file for each design point. An open source software 
package called condor, available from the University of Wisconsin 
(http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor), is used to distribute and manage the MANA jobs in 
parallel across a set of available processors. The oldmcdata software creates the set of 
submit.dat files needed by condor, one for each design point job. A job consists of a set 
of replications for one design point excursion. Upon completion of the runs, oldmcdata 
includes a data postprocessor that combines MANA summary file output from the 
individual design point excursions into one csv file, ready for use with any data analysis 
software package. This output file contains input factor settings from the DOE, the 
random number seed, and outputs for each replication. The SEED Center high-
performance computing cluster configuration used for these runs was composed of 128 
Windows processors, with 2-4 gigabytes (GB) of random-access (RAM) per processor. 
D. NUMBER OF REPLICATIONS 
One replication of the base case MANA takes, on average, 10 minutes, and this 
computational cost must be taken into account when determining how many replications to 
perform. One method for determining an adequate number of replications is the data given in 
Equation 1. We will use this equation to estimate the sample size needed to perform null 
hypothesis significance testing given the Blue casualties’ MOE. Our choice for alpha   , 
which represents Type I error, was 0.05. The choice for power, which is 1 minus beta   , the 
Type II error, was 0.95. In Equation 1, then, αZ 1.96  and Z 1.64  . Our choice for the 
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practical difference we want to detect, in the denominator, was 2, and the estimate for standard 















The resulting sample size  n , given our values described above, is 112. The cost 
in computational power and time, however, might not support doing this many 
replications. We note that we could lower n to 68 by dropping power to 0.8 (a common 
choice), vice 0.95. We turn next to visualizing, in Figure 27, how the half-width of the 
confidence interval for the mean decreases as a function of the number of replications, in 
order to determine where diminishing returns occur. As the confidence interval half-
width decreases, we achieve increased precision on our estimate of the mean. Figure 27 
shows that while 112 samples might be ideal, the additional precision acquired by doing 
between 30 and 100 replications may not be worth the increased computation cost. This 
is particularly true because when we fit metamodels to the resulting output, we are able to 
leverage data collected from the entire design to estimate factor effects. This substantially 
increases the power of the statistical tests. 
 
Figure 26.  Confidence interval half-width diminishing returns, based on the 
number of replications. It appears that the added benefit from going 
from 30 replications to 100 might not be worth the computational 
cost of running a MANA simulation that takes 10 minutes, on 
average, for each simulation. 
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In the end, we choose to perform 30 replications of each of our 2,048 design 
points, resulting in 61,440 total simulation runs. Given access to the SEED Center’s 128 
Windows processors with 2-4 GB of RAM each, we are able to complete the experiment 
in approximately 3.5 days. 
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V. DISTRIBUTED FLIGHT DECK OPERATIONS AND SIMIO 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter begins with a general overview of the deck cycle for aircraft on an 
amphibious ship, such as an LHD, and the selected DES modeling software, Simio. 
Additionally, it covers the benefits and limitations of Simio, which includes why DES is 
also useful to DOD decision makers. Finally, we will review the research questions for 
this first-stage model and describe the Simio modeling. This Simio model is an example 
of what Cioppa, Lucas, and Sanchez (2004) describe as a model that attempts to capture 
“the salient features of the situation without trying to model all of the details that could be 
considered” (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004, p. 172). 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
The principle finding of “Operational Energy/Operational Effectiveness (OE2) 
Investigation for Scalable Marine Expeditionary Brigade Forces in Contingency 
Response Scenarios” is that operational energy consumed from QRF and MEDEVAC air 
platforms launched from the seabase are the primary drivers of energy during 
expeditionary operations. Seabased aviation operations consume energy over both 
workups and the deployment of a MEU. The MEU regularly launches ACE platforms in 
support of a ROMO, including VBSS, HA/DR, A2/AD, etc. The launch and recovery of 
aircraft from the ARG is called the “deck cycle.” Groupings of aircraft that launch 
together for a mission are commonly called “packages.” In order to better understand the 
impacts to operational energy for a BLT force ashore, we will construct a first-stage 
model of a nominal air raid package required for the insertion of the screening force 
described in Chapter II. 
The MEU’s ACE consists of a parent MV-22 squadron reinforced with several 
detachments of light attack, strike, and heavy-lift aircraft from other redeployed units. 
Typically, the ACE consists of 12 MV-22s, 4 AH-1Zs, 2 UH-1Ys, 6 F-35Bs, and  
4 CH-53Ks. The MEU commander may retain the ACE on the LHD or allocate aircraft to 
other air-capable ships (i.e., place aircraft on LPDs) during split or disaggregated 
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operations. These operations require coordination via a detailed flight schedule. A flight 
schedule is produced daily that includes both the Marine aircraft from the ACE and the 
Navy’s search and rescue (SAR) platform, the SH-60. The flight schedule establishes 
when the ships will conduct flight operations (“flight quarters”) and deconflict launch and 
recovery times of aircraft from spots. The only aircraft that requires the use of the entire 
deck for take-off (“deck-run”) is the F-35B. Aircraft are kept on the forward and aft 
“slash” areas prior to being towed out to a spot for launch. A launch, like the MV-22 seen 
taking off in Figure 27 has a sequence of steps leading up to the actual launch: 
1. Aircraft spotted – Aircraft towed from slash to spot. 
2. “Chocks and chains” – Aircraft secured to the flight deck spot  
(i.e., chocks and chains put in place). 
3. Aircraft are loaded with the mission fuel and ordnance. 
4. Startup. 
5. “Breakdown” – Aircraft chains and chocks are removed. 
6. Arming – Ordnance crews and/or crew chiefs remove safety mechanisms 
from weapons and survival systems. 
7. Launch – Deck crews clear the aircraft for subsequent takeoff. 
 
Figure 27.  Figure 28 shows an MV-22 Osprey launching from a forward spot. 
All three aircraft, to include the CH-53E, belong to Marine Medium 
Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (Reinforced) 
(from Achterling, 2014). 
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Three aircraft are shown, two MV-22s—one of which is taking off—and a  
CH-53. The aircraft are assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 
(Reinforced) aboard the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) (Achterling, 2014). 
Figure 28 shows two groupings of MV-22 Ospreys (circled in white), the groups 
are in the forward and the aft “slash.” In the forward “slash” of the LHD there are four 
MV-22s. At least that many are stored in the aft “slash,” which is located aft of the super 
structure. The MV-22s in the “slash” have their rotors and wings folded; an automatic 
process that takes approximately 90 seconds. A tug is used to pull aircraft from the 
“slash” and tow it over to the spot to prepare for start-up and launch. The usable spots for 
the LHD are spots two, four, five, six, seven, and nine. The forward “slash” prohibits the 
use of spot three, while the aft “slash” precludes the use of spot eight. 
  
Figure 28.  MV-22 Ospreys with folded rotors and wings in the forward and aft 
“slash” of the LHD (from Galante, 2009). 
Figure 29 shows MV-22 Ospreys at night preparing for takeoff from the 
amphibious transport dock ship USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19). Two aircraft flying together 
are known as a section. This figure shows the use of expanded spots on the LPD. The 
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center circles are spots one and two; however, in order to allow for four aircraft to be 
spotted, the corner spots are used. The MV-22s with their blades turning both have red 
lights shining and are on spots three and six diagonally across from each other. 
Meanwhile, the MV-22s in their stored configuration (much like the “slash”) on the 
opposite diagonal occupy expanded spots four and five. 
 
Figure 29.  MV-22 Ospreys at night occupying all four of the expanded spots on 
the amphibious transport dock ship USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19). 
Expanded spots three and six have turning aircraft, preparing for 
launch, and expanded spots four and five have MV-22s with their 
rotors and wings folded. These aircraft are assigned to the 22nd 
MEU and the picture was taken during a composite training unit 
exercise (COMPTUEX) in preparation for a deployment 
 (from Smith, 2013). 
All of these aircraft serve the GCE. With the advent of the MV-22 Osprey, 
Marines can travel further and faster inland than with the legacy CH-46 medium-lift 
helicopter. Prior to sailing as an MET-capable MEU, Marines conduct several exercises 
to demonstrate their ability to conduct a long-range raid, far enough that forward arming 
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and refueling points (FARPs) are required before reaching the objective area. Figure 30 
shows the GCE boarding for a long-range raid. 
 
Figure 30.  Marine forces from the 11th MEU cross the flight deck to the five 
MV-22 Ospreys attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 
(Reinforced). The flight deck is that of the amphibious assault ship 
USS Makin Island (LHD-8) (from Fuentes, 2015). 
B. SIMULATION MODELING FRAMEWORK BASED ON INTELLIGENT 
OBJECTS 
1. What is Simulation Modeling Framework Based on Intelligent 
Objects? 
We start with a modeling architecture, Simio, and the goal of gaining insight 
about one aspect of seabased aviation—mission holding associated (Sanchez, 2007). 
From Appendix I, we can see both the MANA and Simio architectures side-by-side. 
People like Simio because it is relatively easy-to-use software for dynamic simulation 
(Kelton, Smith, & Sturrock, 2011). Simio uses intelligent objects, such as customers, 
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infantry, or aircraft, in conjunction with the physical components of the system they are 
in to model and reflect dynamic interactions of entities within a system. Simio works well 
for DES, specifically discrete event, stochastic, models for solving problems (Kelton et 
al., 2011). Simio was industrialized by the same people that developed Arena (another 
type of DES that has been widely used), but leverages early instances of object-oriented 
modeling, which grew into the Simio of today (Kelton et al., 2011).  
2. Benefits of Simio 
Simio is intuitive and easy to use. Once all the objects are created, they can be 
used in multiple simulation models. For the Marine Corps, this is highly useful because 
of the combined visuals, ease of use, and building-block nature to advanced modeling. 
Below is a list that summarizes the benefits of Simio.  
 Visualization—a Simio model looks like the real system. 
 As with many software programs, with Simio it is easy to build large 
models of increased complexity from initial toy models. 
 Simio objects can be used for multiple models. 
 Simio objects can readily be reused and combined to build process 
models. 
 Process models can be easily adjusted and experimented with to gain 
insights. 
 Many experiments can be run (i.e., thousands of replications) and results 
are collected in pivot tables that may be exported to an XML file for 
analysis. (Simio LLC, 2010) 
3. Simio: Limitations and Assumptions 
a. Limitations of Simio 
Simio is limited by the level of detail provided to each object by the user and the 
Simio environment. In this first-stage, launch constraint, model the focus was a long-
range raid and any holding that transpired during the entire operation. The aircraft agents 
in Simio all takeoff and “launch” with the same flight characteristics and profile. 
However, this is known not to be the case for MV-22, CH-53K, F-35B, etc. Therefore, a 
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limitation in Simio is that the modeled system might not reflect the complexity of the real 
system. In aviation, winds, pitch, and roll of the ship, and temperature can alter fuel 
consumption rates. During flight operations, naval traffic can preclude aircraft from 
landing until the ship alters course. Yet, all of these, to include the unique takeoff profile 
of dissimilar aircraft did little to inform the MOEs. Different launches and flight 
conditions, which could have been modeled were not, however, this model had the right 
level of precision to make it valid for the purposes of this broad analysis (Kelton, 2011). 
b. Assumptions Made in Simio 
The primary assumptions in this Simio model are that times for mission holding 
and launch are distributed with a triangular distribution. The simulation is used to better 
understand launch constraints and aircraft flight operations. 
 Triangular distributions are assigned for service times (e.g., LPD slash, 
fuel/arm). 
 Aircraft objects – the launch process is roughly similar for all types of 
aircraft and they are modeled by the same process. 
 A launch includes removing an aircraft from the slash to it being cleared 
for takeoff. 
 The flight schedule launch times representative of a flight schedule are 
generated from a time varying arrival process with hourly granularity. 
 Aircraft from the LHD require mission holding to constitute the package. 
 The LPD has one slash, two spots, one fuel, Arm/De-arm, and one chains 
crew. 
 The LHD has two slashes, three spots, one fuel, Arm/De-arm, and one 
chains crew.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This first stage model is valuable as it generates realistic inputs to the MANA 
second stage model. Additionally, one may adjust the first stage model independent of 
the larger amphibious model, which may be useful for energy-specific insights related to 
air operations. While this Simio model focuses on the flight-deck cycle, one could easy 
apply a first stage model like this to explore other key areas in amphibious assault. One 
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such application is instead of using aircraft launching from the flight deck, use ACV 
departing the LCAC, or infantry departing the ACV. 
The questions guiding this first stage model are: 
 Are there OE2 benefits to conducting distributed ops? 
 Are there OE2 benefits to conducting split ops? 
Addressed in this section are EW 12 aviation-seabase-related particulars that are 
applicable to the deck cycle, and how those were implemented in Simio. We also provide 
further details about the objects in Simio and an overview of the system. 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The purpose of this simulation is to provide a specific look into the OE2 of the 
ACE launching from the seabase in support of amphibious operations. Here, our MOEs 
include: 
 MOE (5): Mission Holding 
 MOE (6): Mission Total Time 
E. SCENARIOS 
Modeled is a 14-aircraft package launched in support of a long-range raid, which 
requires a FARP. There are three available spots on the LHD and two expanded spots on 
the LPD. The SAR aircraft is required throughout flight operations, and the SAR SH-60 
must have a free spot to land on at all times. 
Covered here are:  
 The three scenarios modeled in Simio: All-LHD, Split, and Disaggregated 
Operations (Ops). 
 Modeling particulars. 
 Details on the Time Varying Arrival Rate Table (“flight schedule”), 
servers, and objects. 
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F. MODELING PARTICULARS 
1. Source 
The source node for this long-range raid creates a maximum of 14 total aircraft to 
be launched from the ARG. The source is used to initiate launches according to a time-
varying rate table and these launches may be probabilistically assigned to ships according 
to the scenario modeled. Aircraft may launch from either of the two ships: the LHD and 
the LPD. Aircraft may also be pulled from either the forward or the aft slash on the LHD 
to support the required package. The Marine ACE holds when launched from the LHD. 
The ACE aircraft are:  
 A single SAR SH-60. 
 A section of AH-1Z Super Cobras (attack and escort). 
 A section of F-35B (attack and escort). 
 A command and control UH-1Y (air mission commander platform). 
 Six MV-22 Ospreys providing the required lift for the minimum required 
force and go criteria for the GCE. 
 A section of CH-53Ks for the FARPs. 
Table 5 lays out how many deck spots, slash areas, and crews are modeled in the 
three options described to compare the resources available. Split and disaggregated ops in 
the context of Table 5, are split ops 12/14 aircraft on the LHA and disaggregated ops 
10/14 aircraft on the LHA. 
Table 5.   The three options modeled are: all aircraft launching from the LHD, the 
split, and disaggregated operations. Aircraft launched from the LHD have 
two slashes (forward and aft), three spots, and one crew to facilitate the 
launch sequence. No LPD slash, spots, or crew are available in “all from 
LHD” operations. 
  Slash Spots Crews 
Operations Prop_LHA LHD LPD LHD LPD LHD LPD 
All from LHD 1.0 2 0 3 0 1 0 
Split 12/14 = 0.857 2 1 3 2 1 1 
Disaggregated 10/14 = 0.714 2 1 3 2 1 1 
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The mission modeled is a long-range raid. The composition is 14 aircraft 
launched in any of the three operations listed in Table 5. The model focuses on the 
origination options, which may either be all from the LHD, the split, or disaggregated. 
A requirement (to satisfy it being a long-range raid) is a FARP. From the 
origination options described, aircraft hold as required to constitute the package, transit to 
the objective area, and then FARP. The FARP mission is the responsibility of a section of 
CH-53Ks. The FARP has four fuel points, capable of providing gas to running aircraft in 
four fixed spots (a “hot static FARP”). The CH-53Ks are likely FARP platforms since 
they provide internal fuel stores that support bulk refueling. 
The single-ship SH-60 facilitates the SAR mission, serving as the SAR aircraft. 
This aircraft is required for rotary and tilt-rotor operations. Of note, spot two on the LHD 
is dedicated for SAR operations and cannot be spotted with ACE aircraft. 
Two AH-1Zs, one UH-1Y, and two F-35Bs provide escort, command and control, 
strike, and close air support. These aircraft all safeguard the GCE flying aboard six  
MV-22s. Thus, with the originations described, 2 AHs, 1 UH, 6 MVs, 2 F-35s, 1 SH, and 
2 CHs, totaling 14 aircraft, are modeled. 
Link weights are used to facilitate spilt and disaggregated operations. A link 
weight of zero bars split operations, forcing all 14 aircraft to launch from LHD. For this, 
a numeric property was assigned to the path connecting the source node to either the LPD 
slash or the transfer node, leading to the LHD forward and aft slashes. 
2. Time-Varying Arrival Rate Table 
The flight schedule was created to support the package described. The real-world 
process modeled is the initiation of the launch process for individual aircraft. This is 
modeled from a time-varying arrival rate pulled from a rate table. Table 6 shows the 
Time-Varying Arrival Rate Table. 
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Table 6.   This Time Varying Arrival Rate Table shows the launch of a section of AHs 
within the first 30 minutes of flight operations, followed by the GCE aboard 
six MV-22s in the next 30 minutes, followed by the SAR, FARP, and 
command and control aircraft, until, lastly, the F-35Bs are launched. 
Starting Offset Ending Offset Rate (events per hour) 
Day1, 00:00:00 Day 1, 00:30:00 2 AHs 
Day1, 00:30:00 Day 1, 01:00:00 6 MVs 
Day1, 01:00:00 Day 1, 01:30:00 1 UHs, 1 SHs, 2 CHs 
Day1, 01:30:00 Day 1, 02:00:00 2 F-35Bs 
Another reason for the rate table is that the F-35B requires a deck run, and the 
sequencing of aircraft from and to the spots is dictated this way in practice. 
3. Seabase 
Scenarios include split and disaggregated operations (with the LPD), and all from 
LHD operations (without the LPD). 
a. Launch Process: LHD 
(1) Forward Slash 
Subsequent to the initiation of a launch, the time required to position the aircraft 
is a random variable draw from a random triangular distribution that “draws” with a 
minimum of 15 minutes, mode of 30 minutes, and maximum of 50 minutes. We represent 
this distribution the following way: T~Tri(x,y,z), where the forward slash is S~Tri(15, 30, 
50). Thirty minutes is a commonly accepted length of time to tow an aircraft out of the 
slash and bring it to its spot. 
(2) Aft Slash 
Follows the same parameters as the forward slash: S~Tri(15, 30, 50). 
(3) Resource Node 
Following aircraft being spotted to the initiation of takeoff, the time required for 
fueling, breaking down the chocks and chains, arming, and the launching of an aircraft 
once they are spotted is a random variable draw from a random triangular distribution 
that “draws” with L~Tri(3, 5, 10) for the LHD. This modeled Simio is a limited resource 
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that has one fixed capacity and First In, First Out logic. This embodies the limitations of 
ordnance and fueling crews available to service one spot on the flight deck at a time. 
(4) Mission Holding 
Following takeoff, the holding time required for creating the flight package is a 
random variable draw from a random triangular distribution that “draws” H~Tri(5, 10, 
20). Disparate aircraft traveling on different routes after takeoff from the LHD hold 
linkup for the subsequent transit, objective area, and FARP portions of the mission. 
b. LPD 
(1) Slash 
Follows the same parameters as the forward and aft slash of the LHD; however, 
they are distributed as SL~Tri(2, 5, 7). Aircraft slashed on the expanded spots are more 
readily available for prelaunch procedures than those aboard the LHD once flight quarters 
are sounded. Flight quarters occurs when a ship may is postured to safely conduct flight 
operations. Removing them from the LPD slash often does not entail any aircraft 
movement at all (see Figure 30). 
(2) Resource Node: 
Spotted aircraft on the LPD perform the launch sequence, which is a random 
variable draw from a random triangular distribution that “draws” with LL~Tri(2, 3, 5) for 
the LPD. 
c. Transit to the Objective Area, Objective Area Time on Station, FARP 
Time and Sink 
After the package is constituted, aircraft depart the rendezvous point and transit to 
the objective area and FARP location with transit time, TT, where TT~Tri(40, 60, 120). 
The subsequent objective area time on station, TOS, where TOS~Tri(20, 30, 45) and 
FARP time, FT, where FT~Tri(15, 20, 45) support disparate aircraft, traveling on 
different routes, of varying times, over a broad range of likely missions. All three (transit 
time to the objective area, objective area time on station, and FARP time) follow random 
triangular distributions. 
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Upon completion in the FARP, aircraft depart the process. In Simio, objects check 
out of the system via a sink node. At 10 hours, the simulation ends, with the package of 
aircraft all having arrived at the sink. 
Figure 31 shows a screen shot of the final simulation effort done in Simio. 
 
Figure 31.  Screen shot of the Simio simulation. 
In summary, this section reviewed Simio and its usefulness for discrete event 
simulations, particularly aircraft launch constraints. We saw a varying arrival rate table 
operationally simulates the flight schedule. Finally, we learned about how agents, arrival 
times, resource nodes, and servers were used to model a long-rang raid evolution that 
included a FARP.  
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VI. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Gatchel sums up a sea power’s advantage this way: In spite of the 
availability of modern ground and air transportation to defenders today, 
navies continue to maintain their traditional mobility advantage…no army 
can move with enough combat power to repulse a major assault before the 
landing force has established itself ashore. 
—CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret)  
 
In this chapter, we analyze the data generated from the experiments described in 
the previous chapters, and present main insights. 
A. JMP DATA ANALYSIS TOOL 
JMP is statistical analysis software that provides the capability for analysts to 
visualize and analyze data, including metamodel fitting. JMP can also be used for data 
manipulation prior to analysis. For example, data was concatenated, sorted, and organized 
in JMP. The tools in JMP can create interactive linked graphs, display data histograms and 
statistical summaries, as well as perform regression analysis and other multivariate 
methods. JMP also has a useful journal feature that allows the user to save and organize 
artifacts of the analysis. One of the most attractive features of JMP is its intuitive, context-
dependent, menu-driven interface (Suite of Analytics Software [SAS], 2014). 
B. ANALYSIS OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT EXPERIMENT 
First we present the four MOEs used in this analysis. 
 MOE (1): Blue casualties 
 MOE (2): Red casualties 
 MOE (3): Time to attrite the Red Force to one-third remaining strength 
 MOE (4): FER, which is calculated as (Red casualties +1)/(Blue casualties 
+1) 
Let us now review our scenarios as they relate to the results: 
 1. LCAC (ACV) only 
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 2. LCAC (ACV) + AAV 
 3. LCAC (ACV) + MV-22 
 4. LCAC (ACV) + AAV + MV-22; combines scenarios 2 and 3 
1. Histograms 
Histograms are commonly used to display the distributions of numeric data and 
indicate features of the data such as central tendency, spread, skew, and modality. The 
following histograms are not distributions of the raw output data—the data come from 
different design points averaged together. The results in this section are the means of the 
30 replications at each of the 512 design points.  
a. MOE (1): Blue Casualties 
Figure 32 contains four histograms from left to right: scenario 1 (baseline), 
scenario 2, scenario, 3, and scenario 4.  
 
Figure 32.  Histograms of Blue casualties by scenario. The highest mean of 
Blue casualties occurs for scenario 3. Recall that scenario 3 conducts 
STOM-V, with a wave of MV-22s. Scenario 4 combines scenarios 2 
and 3, so it also shows a high mean number of casualties compared 
to scenarios 1 and 2. 
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To the right of each histogram is a box plot. Box plots will be covered in Section 
2. Below the histograms are quantiles and summary statistics, including the means. 
Scenario 3 has the highest average Blue casualties and scenario 1 has the fewest. We note 
that standard deviation is the smallest during scenario 2. The first two scenario 
histograms are positively skewed. Scenarios three and four are bimodal, with peaks near 
50 casualties and 10 casualties. 
Blue casualties are greatest in scenario 3, when Blue is brought in via MV-22s, 
which means that infantry are more vulnerable than when they are entirely inside ACVs. 
Scenario 4, which combines scenarios 2 and 3, is associated with greater numbers of 
casualties than either the ACV or ACV and AAV scenarios. 
b. MOE (2): Red Casualties 
Figure 33 contains histograms, box plots, and summary statistics for Red 
casualties.  
 
Figure 33.  Red casualties are greatest when Blue attacks with ACVs and AAVs 
in both scenarios 2 and 4. Red’s survival is better when Blue does 
not use the AAVs. Red casualties experience little change from 
scenario 1 to 3. Scenarios 2 and 4, each have waves of AAVs 
accompanying ACVs onboard LCACs. 
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The highest mean Red casualties occur with scenario 4; however, scenario 2 has a 
slightly higher median number of casualties. In any case, scenarios 2 and 4 are very 
similar. Scenarios 1 and 3 are also similar with respect to this MOE. Red casualties are 
greatest when Blue attacks with AAVs and ACVs in both scenarios 2 and 4. In scenario 
4, Blue attacks with a combined force from AAVs/ACVs and infantry brought in from 
MV-22s. This scenario’s strength does not appear to be the MV-22, based on the 
insignificant increase from scenarios 1 to 3, but rather the AAV. All four scenarios, 
interestingly enough, are negatively skewed, as evidenced by the long tails toward low 
casualties (circled in the figure) Nevertheless, Red casualties are lower, with a higher 
frequency when the AAV is not present, as in scenario 3. 
c. MOE (3): Time to Attrite the Red Force to One-Third Remaining 
Strength 
Figure 34 contains the histograms, box plots, and summary statistics for time to attrite the 
Red force to one-third remaining strength, where the fastest mean time occurs with scenario 4. 
 
Figure 34.  Time to attrite the Red force to one-third remaining strength, where 
the fastest mean time occurs with scenario 4. This objective is not 
met 84 times with scenario 1 (512 – 428 = 84). Meanwhile, scenario 
2 has the lowest standard deviation and higher times can be expected 
with scenario 3, seen in the circled portion of the data. 
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There is, however, overlap, as seen with scenarios 1 and 3. The greater frequency 
of long times for scenario 3 makes sense, given the scenario 3 Blue casualty numbers. It 
is important to realize, in general, that achieving one-third remaining strength might not 
always happen. This explains why N is less than 512 for each of the scenarios. We 
achieve this MOE the fewest times during scenario 1—namely, that Blue is slower to 
mass and attrite Red. 
There is good cause for us to revisit the raw output data, since if one design point 
attrites the enemy in only half of the replications—but when it does, does so quickly—a 
low Mean (RedKillTime) only tells part of the story. Therefore, a wise approach is to 
create a column next to the FER in the full data that is a binary result, where success is 
attriting Red to one-third of its remaining forces. Figure 35 shows the probability of 




Figure 35.  Realized probability for attriting Red to one-third of its remaining 
forces. 
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The highest probability occurs in scenario 4. There is a significant jump in 
probability from scenario 1 to scenario 2, and then little gain thereafter from scenario 4. 
In the context of number of assets fighting on the battlefield, there is support that scenario 
2 gives the best bang for the buck. 
d. MOE (4): Force Exchange Ratio, Which is Calculated as (Red 
Casualties +1)/(Blue Casualties +1) 
Figure 36 contains the histograms, box plots, and summary statistics for the FER MOE. 
 
Figure 36.  FER MOE. This is calculated as (Red casualties +1)/(Blue casualties 
+1) with the raw data. Higher values imply that Red experienced 
greater casualties than Blue. Blue achieves the highest FER with 
scenarios 2 and 1. 
 Recall that the FER is calculated as the ratio of Red forces lost to Blue forces 
lost, where 1 is added to both the numerator and denominator in the raw output data. 
After it is calculated, then FER is averaged over the replications. So, for our analysis, 
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higher is better. If the FER is high, as it is in scenario 2, that means that Blue is losing far 
fewer casualties than Red. The FERs for scenarios 1 and 2 are similar, and the FERs for 
scenarios 3 and 4 are similar. Nevertheless, when Blue is inside vehicles, Red loses 
casualties at a larger rate than Blue, as evidenced by the higher FERs in scenarios 1 and 
2. The impact from bringing forces in via helicopter exposes infantry earlier in the 
amphibious assault and makes them more vulnerable, resulting in more Blue casualties 
and fewer Red casualties. 
FER is another example where the raw output data may provide insights that 
could perhaps be lost during means analysis. Figure 37 shows the scenarios with the 
highest mean FER (scenario 2) and lowest mean FER (scenario 3). 
 
Figure 37.  FER MOE with raw output data. Highest is scenario 2 and the 
lowest is scenario 3. 
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One final comparison can be made between the FER and Blue casualties. 
Analytically, we observe that since Blue casualties are in the denominator of the rational 
fraction, that a higher FER signals a greater loss ratio of Red to Blue. Figure 38 shows Blue 
casualties on the y-axis, with the scenario across the bottom, and FER across the top. 
 
Figure 38.  Relationship between Blue casualties (y-axis) and FER (top), by 
scenario. Higher Blue casualties are seen at the far left when FER is 
the lowest. 
2. Box Plots 
Next, we look at the output with box plots. Although they were part of the output 
in the previous section, we will cover them more in depth in this section. It can be useful, 
for example, to display box plots grouped by levels of a categorical variable. Figure 39 
shows an illustration of box plot. 
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Figure 39.  Depicted is a box plot. Box plots in JMP have whiskers that extend 
out to 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). The boxed region 
shaded in gray represents the IQR, bounded by the 25th and 75th 
quantiles. JMP depicts outliers with large dots that fall outside of 1.5 
times the IQR (from Lucas, 2014). 
a. MOE (1) and MOE (2) 
Figure 40 shows a side-by-side comparison of Blue and Red casualties.  
 
Figure 40.  This figure shows that there is little difference for Red between 
scenarios 2 and 4, while Blue incurs many more casualties in 
scenarios 3 and 4. 
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Note that the vertical axes on the two plots are different. These plots confirm that 
scenarios 3 and 4 have higher Blue casualties, but that scenario 4 has an IQR that covers 
more of the lower-casualty range. Similarly, Red incurs fewer casualties in scenarios 1 
and 3, and more casualties in scenarios 2 and 4. 
Figure 41 contains box plots for Blue casualties’ MOE and Red casualties, this 
time grouped by scenario, number of LCACs (right vertical axis), and debark distance 
(across the top). 
 
Figure 41.  The Blue casualties’ plot on the left shows that Blue casualties are 
more influenced by scenario than by debark distance or number of 
LCACs. The Red casualties’ plot on the right shows that Red 
casualties are influenced by debark distance, LCAC count, and 
scenario. 
The plot on the left shows Blue’s casualties from scenarios 3 and 4 are higher for 
all nine possible configurations. Further, Blue casualties do not seem to be affected by the 
number of LCACs. Meanwhile, the plot of Red casualties on the right shows that they are 
the highest when Blue debarks from less than five nm and greater than three LCACs 
(outside the circle). Casualties for Red are less with higher frequency inside the circle. 
In order to get a better understanding of Blue casualties, we plot the mean number 
of Blue infantry squad casualties by scenario and squad number to gain insight into which 
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infantry squads are being hit the hardest. Figure 42 shows increased Blue casualties from 
the MANA squads representing dismounted infantry from scenario 3. 
  
Figure 42.  Blue casualties during scenarios 3 and 4 are attributed mostly to 
those infantry arriving via MV-22s, STOM-V. 
3. Statistical Tests to Compare Scenarios 
In this section, we further explore the differences between scenarios, this time 
through the use of statistical tests. Additionally, we will cover hypothesis testing: 
 Define hypothesis testing 
 Define p-value 
 Two-Sample t-Test for equal means: analytically and with JMP 
 Paired comparison 
A Hypothesis (H) is a statement or claim about a population or populations, often 
concerning their parameters. The null hypothesis H0, is the claim initially assumed to be 
true. Next, is the Ha or the alternative hypothesis which is the assertion, contrary to H0. 
In a two-sample t test, the null hypothesis is H0 : μ1- μ2 = 0. We state the alternative 
hypothesis as Ha : μ1 ≠ μ2, which is to say that the difference between the two means is 
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not equal to zero. In other words, we claim that the means are the same and research 
whether this is the case. Often the Ha is called the research hypothesis; however, the 
burden of proof required is to disprove H0. Proof is measured by evaluating the p-value. 
P-value is the probability of seeing data this extreme or more extreme, assuming that the 
H0 is true. The proof in this section will be shown graphically, calculating it analytically 
requires the appropriate test statistic value. The two-sample t test for the means test 










Paired testing compares the outcomes between two scenarios under the same 
conditions. This is why it is often called paired comparison, which is a one-sample test 
on the differences of the data. For example, a paired comparison between scenario 2 and 
scenario 4, with the response “Red casualties” MOE, would subtract the Red casualty 
outputs from scenarios 2 and 4, respectively, at each of the 512 design points. The 
histograms showed high variability across many of the MOEs by scenario. If we detect 
higher variability from averaging, then the associated two-sample problem may not 
reflect the detail we seek, which is why a paired comparison between scenarios 2 and 4, 
without incorporating the differences from it being scenarios 2 and 4, is preferred. The 
analogy for paired comparisons with multiple samples is to treat each design point as a 
block when performing ANOVA. 
a. Scenario: Two-Sample t Test; One-Way Analysis of Variance of Red 
Casualties by Scenario 
Figure 43 contains an excerpt of the result of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
procedure of mean Red casualties by scenario. The y-axis is the mean number of Red 
casualties, the x-axis represents the scenario, and a horizontal line at 23 represents the 
overall mean of the response. We report the results without blocking on design point, and 
note that blocking reduces p-values (showing higher levels of statistical significance) but 
does not change the qualitative conclusions. Appendix C contains the full results of the 
ANOVA procedure of mean Red casualties by scenario. In addition, Appendix D 
contains the study for the raw output data.  
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Figure 43.  This plot shows a one-way analysis of the summarized output  
(2,048 rows) for “Red casualties” by scenario, with the number of 
Red casualties on the vertical axis. In red, we see overlapping circles 
for scenarios 1 and 3. Scenarios 2 and 4 have similar boxplots and 
circles which are “overlapped.”  
Figure 44 shows a Connecting Letters Report and the confidence level used. 
Scenarios 4 and 2 are designated with “A” and scenarios 3 and 1 are designated with “B.” 
 
Figure 44.  Connecting Letters Report at the 95% confidence level. 
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Another way to summarize the comparison of the mean number of Red casualties 
across scenarios is with an Ordered Differences Report. In this report, the difference 
between each pair of scenarios is summarized with a mean difference, as well as a 
confidence interval and p-value. What is valuable about this report is that it shows ranked 
differences between scenarios, with scenarios 4 and 1 being the most different and 4 and 
2 being the least. Figure 45 shows the ordered differences report, and the red box shows 
the dissimilar scenario groupings. 
 
Figure 45.  The Ordered Differences Report. 
We now repeat the ANOVA using the full set of output (using data from all 
design points and replications), vice just the 2,048 points, where each design point was 
summarized by its mean. Figure 46 shows the result of the ANOVA test on the full 
output. This result is similar to the previous result, except that this time, scenarios 3 and 1 
(connecting letters B and C) are deemed significantly different. 
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Figure 46.  One-way analysis of Red casualties, based on the full set of outputs. 
We note, however, that there is still not much practical difference between the 
means. It is important to remember that not all statistically significant differences are 
considered practically significant. From Appendix H similar results can be seen with the 
student t-Test. 
4. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
We now turn to multiple linear regression analysis to explore the relationship between 
our MOEs and the experiment factors. We start with a summary of the technique. 
Simple linear regression is a model with a single regressor, x, that has a 
relationship with the response y. The model is: 0 1 1    y ß ß x    . The response y is a 
random variable. The parameters ß0 and ß1 are unknown and must be estimated with data. 
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To transition to multiple regression variables or regressors you add more terms. Here we 
will also consider interaction terms ( 1 2x x ) and polynomial terms to degree two  
( 2
1x ). Equation 2 shows the full second-order fitted multiple linear regression model for 
two regressors, 1x and 2x .  
 2 20 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 1 5 2y x x x x x x            (2) 
How well the model fits the data is measured with R Squared, root mean squared 
error, and plots of the errors    from our actual versus predicted values. R Squared 
indicates what percentage of the variability is explained by the regression model.  If our 
interest were prediction, additional model adequacy checks could involve assessing the 
whether the errors are distributed normally with constant variance  2 . Fortunately, the 
estimated regression coefficients are robust to departures from normality and constant 
variance, so the regression models can be used to identify the most important factors and 
identify the nature of the relationship between these factors and the response. 
a. Main Effects 
The first fitted model is the main effects model for Blue casualties. This model 
was fit using the stepwise functionality in JMP. Both “mixed” and “forward” were used 
in model generation. Between BIC and p-value with p < 0.01 to enter and exit the model, 
p-value seemed to give the better models. The selected mode using Standard Least 
Squares and effect screening has an R squared of 0.53. The model has 17 terms, with the 
most important factor being scenario 3. Figure 47 shows the summary of fit for the full 
output and the most important parameters in the sorted parameter estimates  s . 
 
Figure 47.  Full uncompressed output, “Blue casualties.” Scenario 3 increases 
“Blue casualties,” while scenarios 2 and 1 decrease “Blue 
casualties.”  
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Figure 47 shows that “Blue casualties” are heavily influenced by scenario 3. As a 
matter of fact “Blue casualties” are higher in scenario 3 than in scenarios 1 and 2. 
Increases in InfHit2k (i.e., infantry hit to kill) decreases “Blue casualties.” Not listed is 
anything pertaining to speed. 
Figure 48 shows that “Red casualties” increase with ACV speed, LCAC count, 
LCAC speed, and scenario 2. “Red casualties” decrease with ACV debark distance, 
scenario 1, and scenario 3. Not listed in is anything pertaining to force protection or hits 
to kill. 
 
Figure 48.  Full uncompressed output, “Red casualties” depend on ACV speed, 
debark distance, LCAC quantity, and LCAC speed. 
Figure 49 shows the prediction profiler for “Red casualties.” The figure on the left 
supports fast LCACs, AAVs, and ACVs. The plots on the right support larger numbers of 
“Red casualties” with scenarios 2 and 4; however, they make a case for debark distances 
of 5 nm and 12 nm, and three or more LCACs. 
 
Figure 49.  Red casualties increase with all three speeds: LCAC, AAV, and 
ACV. Similarly, scenarios 2 and 4, and LCAC quantities of three 
and four increase the number of Red casualties. “Red casualties” 
decrease when the ACVs are debarked further than 12 nm from the 
shore. 
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The most important factors for “Red casualties” continue to be speed, quantity, 
and scenario dependent, which perhaps is justification for pursuing further “Red 
casualty” MOEs. 
Finally, we look at the “time” MOE. In a main effects only model, with 12 terms, 
the “time to attrite Red to one-third remaining strength” is affected, as one would expect, 
by speed and distance. The speed that contributes most to the MOE is the ACV speed, not 
the LCAC speed. LCAC speed and LCAC quantity all decrease the “time” MOE. 
Meanwhile, debark distance and scenario 1 increase it. Figure 50 shows the “time” MOE 
summary of fit. A partition tree (not shown) of the probability of attriting red to one-third 
of its original forces gives similar results: ACV speed and debark distance are the two 
most influential factors.  
 
Figure 50.  “Time” MOE. ACV speed contributes most to reducing the “time to 
attrite Red Force to one-third remaining strength.” Debark distances 
and scenario 1 take longer to attrite Red to the desired level.  
With regard to the number of LCACs and the debark distance, Figure 50 shows 
the following added benefit and importance: 
 Being at 5 nm is extremely important. 
 Scenarios 2 and 4 are preferred. 
 Going from 2 to 3 LCACs helps much more than going from 3 to 4 
LCACs. 
 Thus, for the “time” MOE, it increases with distance; however, the benefit of 
going from two to three LCACs is much greater than from three to four. Figure 51 shows 
the prediction profiler for scenario, debark distance, and LCAC quantity. 
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Figure 51.  The “time” MOE and how scenario, ACV debark distance, and 
LCAC quantity compare. 
b. Comparison of Main Effects 
In this section we fit simple main effect models for the MOEs. These models 
reflect the primary variables, and support general insights. The summary of fit and the 
sorted parameter estimates are provided below. Figure 52 shows Blue casualties” on the 
left and “Red casualties on the right.  
 
Figure 52.  The main effect models for Blue and Red casualties. 
At the top of the figure are the R Squared values that measure how much of the 
variance is explained by the model below. This measure of observed variance is often 
referred to as goodness of fit. Meanwhile, the sorted plots below show the model in a 
ranked column that depicts most influence to least. Each term has an estimate, standard 
error, t-ratio, shaded horizontal bar, and Prob >|t|. First, the estimate signals that the 
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“Blue casualties,” for example, will increase by 17.6 casualties if in scenario three. The 
most significant factor for Blue is scenario, while for “Red casualties” it is ACV speed. 
Significance is seen from both the t-ratio and Prob >|t|. In another example, seen with 
“Red casualties” there are nine terms that have t-ratios greater than four, likewise “Blue 
casualties” only has four. Also, for Blue those four are really just levels of scenario and 
LCAC speed. Figure 53 shows the main effects models for FER and “time” MOE. 
 
Figure 53.  The main effect models for FER and “time” MOE. 
(1) Discussion 
From the summary of fits, we see that the highest R Square is attained with the 
time it takes to attrite red to one-third strength. Other R Squares are 0.38 or less with the 
lowest being FER. Depending on the MOE selected above at most 50% of the variability 
could be explained by these main effects, while the worst is 10%. Combat is inherently 
difficult to predict, which means that these values are actually doing well, but should be 
used for comparison rather than prediction. 
For Blue casualties, there are benefits to ACV debarking at closer distances (e.g., 
“LCDbkDist [25-12]”), namely that Blue benefits from being inside 12 nm. However, 
this benefit is nothing compared to that of being in scenarios one and two. One might 
make many more replications to support the impact from “LCACMvtSpd” or LCAC 
speed.  
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Indeed, “Red casualties “increase with and decrease with varying signs through 
nine different parameters. ACV speed, LCAC quantity, speed, and scenario two are 
increase Red casualties. Scenarios one and three decrease casualties. 
(2) Most Important Factors 
 Blue: The most important factors are scenario and distance. It is not clear 
that Blue experiences a benefit from speed. As a matter of fact we see that 
LCAC speed and scenario three with fast aircraft, increase Blues losses. 
Blue vehicles are arriving to the objective and dismounting infantry. A 
byproduct of the design that was not anticipated was that with scenario 
two there are more vehicles which increase both the weapons and armored 
personnel carriers to distribute the force across. 
 Red: Speed and quantity increase red casualties most. Incidentally ACV 
and LCAC should be made fast before the AAV. Debark distances beyond 
12 nm and scenario 1 decrease casualties more than scenario 3.  
 FER/time: With differing information for MOE one and two, we turn to 
FER and the “time” MOE. The two most important factors seen from FER 
and “time” to give Blue an advantage are scenario and speed. Blue might 
seek to get into scenario 2 most often and initially explore investments in 
speed in the ACV. 
(3) Insights 
Two general insights are discovered from the evidence presented from the main 
effect models. 
 FLOT speed: The basic concept is that speed works to a certain point. 
Blue infantry arriving in MV-22 outpace the time required to mass force 
ashore. In the “time” MOE we get a sense for the right pace. ACV speed, 
LCAC speed, and multiple connectors create a good pace.   
 Force protection: What is not seen is a mention of infantry hits to kill, 
concealment, or number of agents. Red consists of a formidable force of 
28 agents. To give the defending force the advantage 18 Red infantry 
require 11 hits to kill, and are 70% concealed. The force in the defense has 
increased staying power and defensibility. Force protection is nested in the 
increased casualties from scenario 3; however, it is not explicitly 
influential to the attacking force. 
A battle is challenging to predict. R squared captures that stochastic behavior of 
agents interacting and responding to what their sensors are telling them. This research 
does incorporate 77 of the prominent tangibles associated with amphibious assault; 
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however, it does not capture intangibles such as breakdowns, Marine leadership, and 
luck.  
(4) Major Conclusions and Findings 
Dismounts and infantry arriving to the objective incur greater casualties. A self-
deploying capability similar to the AAV increases the number of vehicles that Blue 
brings to the fight, which in turn increases fire power and distributes the force to absorb 
risk from enemy fire. Channelizing terrain, obstacles, and ambush locations can fix the 
attacking force for defending artillery. Conversely, urban terrain does limit line of sight 
and trajectory for common projectiles. The risks of urban terrain are not covered here. 
Marines will use the next AAV and ACV in a way that must be robust. The AAV was to 
gets people ashore safely and efficiently. The solution is not one parameter. Amphibious 
assault uses a system of systems, where several parameters are determined and then 
reassessed. If an LCAC is attrited the seabase might have to maneuver within 12 nm. 
Stochastic models provide results that afford simulation that may return different 
solutions, but its ability to predict combat and battle is labored at best. 
c. Partition Trees 
Another analysis method is partition trees. In these models the dependant variable 
is still a MOE. JMP splits on the most influential factor based on “distance” between 
points in the collapsed output. Incidentally, this distance is the variance—and for the 
Marine Corps’ next combat vehicle baseline and desired values are going to drive the 
eventual procurement. Key performance parameters are those items that a program like 
the ACV will be assessed against to see if it is proving the warfighter with what is 
required. 
(1) “Blue Casualties” Partition Tree 
While Figure 54 does not show all 77 potential candidate factors, what it shows 
was the first and most important split was scenario.  
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Figure 54.  “Blue casualties” partition tree. 
Furthermore, we are doing a better job explaining the variability in just four splits 
with an R Squared of 0.53. A key threshold after splitting on scenario 1 and 2 is ACV 
sensor range at 2,192 meters. A less effective sensor increases casualties. Likewise, if 
Blue must choose scenario 4 or 3, and if Red infantry can classify targets at distances 
greater than 4,208 m, then the ACV and the infantry inside require increased force 
protections. Figure 55 shows the split history with R Square value on the y-axis and 
number of splits on the x-axis. 
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Figure 55.  Blue casualties’ partition tree, split history for mean Blue casualties, 
the black vertical line at eight splits shows little increased R squared 
from the four splits show previously. 
(2) “Red Casualty” Partition Tree 
The “Red casualties” partition tree show shown in Figure 56 indicates ACV speed 
is the most important factor. This tree shows an excellent example of a mitigation that 
might arise in the acquisitions process of the ACV or the next SSC.  
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Figure 56.  “Red casualties” partition tree, most import split ACV speed greater 
than 16 knots (18 mph). 
What if technology readiness level cannot get the ACV to swim and maneuver 
on-land at speeds comparable to our top capability, commonly referred to as the speed of 
the M1A1? First, the speed of ACV speed splits at 16 knots (18 mph), which is less than 
half of the M1A1s speed. Second, the fighting in convention with scenario 2 and 4 in a 
slow ACV gives about the same MOE as fighting in a fast one inside 12 nm. The 
complexity of amphibious assault and the system of connectors, amphibians, and threat 
make the problem tough to break down. This is one approach to refine and quantify what 
matters most, when it is all important. Figure 57 shows the split history with R Square 
value on the y-axis and number of splits on the x-axis. 
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Figure 57.  Red casualties’ partition tree, where more splits might explain more 
of the variance. 
(3) Main Effects and Partition Tree Comparison of Most Important Factors 
The partition trees reflected specific speeds and sensor ranges. The main effects 
gave ranked significance levels. Still, the models in the main effects did not satisfy 
normal residuals to confirm significance. For the main effects models the most important 
factors were not the same. Blue leaned heavily on scenario and Red on speed. For Red 
casualties, what was a ranked list of many important factors, now tells a story.  
 Red casualties: for this MOE there are three important factors, which are 
ACV speed, scenario, debark distance, ACV censor range, and LCAC 
quantity. 
 Blue casualties: Emphasis is still on scenario; however, ACV sensor, Red 
infantry’s sensor, and force protection are both quantifiable and highly 
influential. 
d. Multiple Linear Regression Models 
As a result of our main effect models we will now explore interactions and non-
linear regressors. Recall that each experiment uses 512 design points. The modeling 
approach in JMP is a stepwise one that examines the p-value against 0.01 to enter the 
model. The entire surface for both two-way interactions and polynomials to degree two 
were examined for each of the MOEs.  
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The next side-by-side comparison gives a good depiction of the non-linear effects 
of increased degrees of freedom from additional parameters. In other words, there are 
diminishing returns to highly complicated models. Figure 58 and Figure 59 show side-by-
side comparisons for all MOE. We see we are able to best explain the variation in the 
“time” MOE shown in Figure 59. For “time,” “Blue casualties,” and “Red casualties” 
with approximate 10 parameters we can expect R squared values of 0.5. Figure 59 shows 
that we are able to best explain the variation in the “time” MOE. 
 
Figure 58.  R square vs. p (number of parameters) for “Blue casualties” on the 
left and “Red casualties” on the right. 
 
Figure 59.  R square vs. p (number of parameters) for “time” on the left and 
“FER” on the right. 
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For “time,” “Blue casualties,” and “Red casualties,” with approximate 10 
parameters, we can expect R squared values of 0.5 The R Square analysis shows that 
while many parameters might increase R Square that we achieve R Square 0.5 or great 
with few terms. Each plot shows the max attainable R Square in the top right. Knowing 
the best R Squared and is useful in determining a good multiple linear regression model. 
Approach for determining multiple regression fitted models: 
 Select input parameters and choose the entire response surface for main 
effects, quadratic, and two-way interactions. 
 Compare stepwise results with R Squared and degrees of freedom. 
 Inspect p the number of parameters in conjunction with R squared, and 
adjusted R squared. 
Here, the objective is to decrease the amount of parameters in the final model, 
while ensuring we find the “best” fit model. As mentioned previously, a slightly higher R 
squared is not worth the addition of factors that unnecessarily increase the complexity of 
the model. Hierarchy is when we chose to keep main effects terms if quadratic and two-
way interactions contain a factor that might not otherwise have been as influential or 
significant to the model. 
First, we look at the multiple linear regression for “Blue casualties.” Figure 60 
shows an actual by predicted plot. Additional graphs and results for the parsimonious 
multiple linear regression models for each MOE are provided in Appendix E.  
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Figure 60.  Predicted mean blue casualties, with actual observations shown with 
black dots. The dashed blue line depicts the average blue casualties. 
In Figure 60, the red line represents the predicted mean blue casualties compared 
to the observed black dots. The dashed blue line depicts the average blue casualties. This 
plot shows that there are many outliers and that blue experiences, out of many simulated 
amphibious assaults, casualties in the range from zero to 90. These results do not provide 
normal residuals, which are one of our required assumptions; however, give effective 
insights to concept platforms such as the future ACV. 
 Second, Figure 61 shows the summary of fit and R squared.  
 
Figure 61.  Mean “Blue casualties” summary of fit. The R squared is 55%, and 
the R squared adjusted is 55%, implying that over half of the 
variation is explained by this model.  
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Third, after we are satisfied with the R squared, we next see a ranked list of the 
model’s factors. Figure 62 shows the sorted parameter estimates for this advanced 
regression model.  
 
Figure 62.  Mean “Blue casualties” sorted parameter estimates. 
Most notably is the quadratic factor for Red infantry classification range. The 
implication there is that if Red classifies an agent as enemy (i.e., Blue), then Blue 
casualties decrease. Though there is an advantage to correctly classifying the enemy, the 
affect is Red engages earlier, which in turn exposes Red agents to Blue fire power. 
Nevertheless, if Red’s maximum effective range for their weapon system is increased, the 
estimate suggests that it would have to be increased greatly to achieve an increase in Blue 
casualties. 
Next, is the prediction profiler in JMP that is used to form prediction intervals 
based on adjusting the default levels in the fields provided. The following factors are 
displayed: infantry hits to kill (i.e., force protection), ACV sensor range, Red 
classification range, Red max effective range, and scenario. The prediction profile is 
highly useful because it depicts changes in MOE based on the main effects. The concave 
down or bent curve for the Red infantry sensor peaks at a range that covers the 3 km of 
transition from the sea to the shore from the location of Red’s defense.  
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Figure 63.  Mean “Blue casualties” MOE, prediction profiler. Force protection 
and ACV sensor range reduce Blue casualties and scenario increase 
the number of casualties. The x-axis is the number of hits, range 
(meters), and scenario for the main effects. The y-axis is the mean 
number of casualties. 
The R squared graphs of all four principal MOE show that we could explain more 
variance with increased degrees of freedom. Due to the experiment size this could be 
readily done in JMP, however, additional terms become less intuitive and confound what 
is highly specific an interesting. The force protection contributes slightly the MOE, 
however, having a decent sensor, the right mission scenario, and the ability to reduce 
signature during the transition to shore are vital to keeping Blue casualties low. What’s 
nice is many of these can be support by sound operation planning and digital 
interoperability of systems. An example of interoperability is the ability to view the 
sensor feed from another asset.  
Last, is the Pareto plot, which is a highly useful illustration that shows whether or 
not additional terms should be added to the model. The curved line flattens vertically 
towards the bottom or last factor, which is a two-way interaction between debark distance 
and LCAC quantity. The finding here is that no additional terms are required. Figure 64 
shows the Pareto plot for “Blue casualties.”  
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Figure 64.  Pareto plot for “Blue casualties.” The curved line supports that little 
additional variance will be gained with increased degrees of freedom 
or more parameters. 
(1) Insights 
All combinations of quadratic and two-way interactions were considered for the 






 ). The interactions between quantity of 
LCAC and debark distance, Red classification and Red max weapon range, and debark 
distance and ACV speed list a few. The SSC, ACV, and AAV upgrades represent three 
developing systems that will interact. This interaction in their development cannot be 
overlooked. 
Consequently, an analysis for all MOE 1-4 confirm the challenges with designing 
a robust system that works for all scenarios. While scenario type being significant for all 
MOE is a function of the model, it also shows that what must be attained—namely, a 
family of systems that work well together. Additionally, since scenario affects Blue and 
not Red, it seems reasonable that Blue could provide an operating procedure that 
mitigates casualties. Yet, the debark distance showed strong significance for MOEs “Red 
casualties” and “time,” but not “Blue casualties.” The reason for this, which is inherited 
by the model, is Blue masses force ashore prior to proceeding to the objective. While 
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there are risks with increased distance between waves of SSC with ACV and support, the 
range from the threat and blue staying power appears to provide a defensible force that is 
not too affected by how far ACV swim inland. What’s more is that this was across the 
slowest ACV and fastest ACV designs. Incidentally, ACV speed is necessary to swim, 
cross terrain, maneuver, and quickly close with the objective. 
Table 7.   This is a summary of the multiple regression models explored for MOEs 1-
4. 
 
 Advanced Regression Main Effect BIC Comparison  
MOE R sq. Adj R sq. p R sq. Adj R sq. R sq. Adj R sq. p 
Blue cas. 0.55 0.55 12 0.36 0.36 0.57  0.56 12 
Red cas. 0.48 0.47 14 0.38 0.38 0.48 0.47 17 
Time 0.59 0.58 14 0.516 0.513 0.59 0.58 14 
FER 0.34 0.33 12 0.10 0.09 0.34 0.33 12 
(2) Conclusion 
Both “time” MOE models have the same “top four” influential factors, placing 
particular emphasis on speed. ACV speed, LCAC speed, debark distance, and LCAC 
quantity are the most influential factors in two different modeling approaches each with 
good fit. 
Many of the procurement decisions today are made with protecting Marines in 
mind, particularly the vehicles that transport infantry. Most of the casualties occurred 
after dismounting their armored ACV. Force protection cannot be overlooked since the 
risks associated with combat, and the decision as to when to dismount infantry from 
inside vehicles is a tough call, which is highly situation dependent.  
 “Blue casualties” – In the main effects model LCAC speed and debark 
distance are most applicable. In the advanced model force protection was 
more important, as was a quadratic relationship in Red classification 
range. Had we looked at main effects only, force protection would have 
been missed.  
 “Red casualties” – Both models support a heavy reliance on speed. Most 
important was ACV speed. The advanced model identified that the 
interaction between debark distance and the quantity of LCAC is 
significant. In the model when LCAC are either lost due to maintenance or 
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effective fire the remaining gear is transitioned ashore by the number of 
LCAC. Thus, two LCACs paying the cost of long transits for each wave 
ashore do less to attrite Red as well as more LCAC. 
 “Time” – This particular MOE does a few things well (Appendix E). Both 
the main effects and the advanced model each fit well, as seen by their 
summary of fit data and the summary table.  
 “FER” – This MOE shows that the warfighting potential with the baseline 
is rather good, since subsequent scenarios like scenario 2 show a less 
significant increase in MOE. Additionally, of the models, the FER 
regression model does poorly compared to other MOEs at explaining the 
variability in amphibious assault.  
5. Simio: Discrete-Event Simulation 
First, we review the MOE for the first stage model:  
1. MOE (5): Mission Holding 
2. MOE (6): Mission Total Time 
In this section, we cover findings for our last two MOES, “Mission Holding” and 
“Total Time.” For these, 1,000 replications were run with the following experimental 
design: 
 
Figure 65.  The Simio experiment had three primary scenarios, run with 1,000 
replications, one control “prop_LHA,” a response. The response is 
“Mission Total Time.” 
The Simio experiment was comprised of 1,000 replications. The probability that 
aircraft launched form the LHA was determined by the type being either split (12/14 
aircraft to be launched from the LHA) or disaggregated (10/14 aircraft to be launched 
from the LHA). Results came in the form of over three million rows of data (3,917,160). 
(1) MOE (5): Mission Holding 
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Figure 66 shows an excerpt of the results provided in the pivot table in Simio. 
 
Figure 66.  Pivot table in Simio, the category “Holding Time” had to be 
extracted from the entire data set for all scenarios only all aircraft 
launching from LHA and disaggregated operations being show 
(all_LHA and disaggOps). 
Subset and data cleaning techniques in JMP were applied to extract 39,567 rows 
of useable mission holding data.  
Mean mission holding was highest when aircraft were all made to launch from the 
LHA. When launched from the LHA, all 14 aircraft experienced holding as prescribed in 
the model. Savings were 10% when performing split operations and 12.5% from 
disaggregated operations. Figures 67-69 show the mean holding and results from the 14 
entities represent aircraft conducting the long-range raid. 
 
Figure 67.  Mean mission holding hours for 14 aircraft launching from the LHA 
only, 0.32 hours. 
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Figure 68.  Mean mission holding hours, all aircraft, during split operations, 
0.29 hours. 
 
Figure 69.  Mean mission holding hours, all aircraft, during disaggregated 
operations, 0.28 hours. 
Mission holding consists of three groupings consistent with the triangular 
distribution. High frequencies of mission holding occurred at six minutes, 30 minutes, 
and some as high as an hour. Average holding for disaggregated operations was 16.8 
minutes, where all LHA operations had close to 20 minutes (19.2). 
(2) Insight 
Our MANA model, scenario three showed increased casualties. Figure 70 shows 
the percentage increase from the baseline in casualties from scenarios 2, 3, and 4. 
 112 
 
Figure 70.  STOM-V graph of increased casualties with scenario 3. 
Aviation insight about increased casualties from dismounted infantry. 
Operationally, it is almost always planned for to hold after inserting infantry for 
contingencies such as CASEVAC/MEDEVAC and emergency extract (Team 
Expeditionary & Cohort 311-132, 2014). The amount of holding generated by the Simio 
model is a best case. Calculations here, however, will only account for holding associated 
with the launch of aircraft and should be seen as the lowest total savings. 
Spreadsheet calculations are made to transform holding data into potential savings 
in energy and money. First, we combine average mission holding and burn rates for the 
principal drivers of energy the MV-22 and CH-53. We look at just these two platforms 
because the F-35B does not join the MEU until it sails and this research wishes to 
incorporate energy savings during the length workup period.  
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Table 8.    The top line has all LHA, split, and disaggregated operations. Below are 
the low, operational planning, and high end burn rates in one table (i.e., 
“lo,” ”Planning,” and “hi”). These numbers provide a range for a decision 
maker. 
Another calculation is made to convert mission holding (hours) and burn rate 
(lbs/hr) in to pounds of fuel burned per mission. Figure 71 shows pounds of fuel burned 
from the three scenarios at three potential levels. 
 
Figure 71.  The bar graph shows pounds of fuel burned per sortie. A sortie is 
defined as one hour of flight launched from a ship. 
Thus, the combined assault mission holding fuel for both the MV-22 and the CH-
53K can be calculated. For the six-month workup period, there are eight long-range raids 
given for a MEU, which either has a low, operational planning, or high number of raids. 
After raids done for training on workups, there are additional “real-world” raids 
complete. For the six-month MEU deployment, we look at three levels of deployment 
 
ALL “LHA” “Split” “Disaggregated” 
 Mean Holding (hrs) 0.328 0.295 0.288 
   Low (lo) Planning High (Hi)  
Burn Rate MV-22 2,500 3,200 4,700 
pounds/hour 
(lbs/hr) 
Burn Rate CH-53K 2,900 3,600 4,900 lbs/hr 
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intensity consisting of 6-, 24-, or 48-raid missions. Figure 72 shows the impact of assault 
mission holding for the MEU based on deployment intensity. 
 
Figure 72.  Assault aircraft on a MEU deployment at three levels of deployment 
intensity consisting of 6-, 24-, or 48-raid missions. 
For the purpose of this research a mission is a long range raid. Workups consist of 
two missions for each at sea training period prior to the actual deployment. With four 
training periods (e.g., certification exercise [CERTEX]), eight missions are added in with 
whether the MEU is conducting a mission every month, week, or twice a week. Figure 73 
shows the money saved after 10 years of operating either split or disaggregated. To 
convert the mission holding fuel to dollars, again we use spreadsheet calculators. 
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Figure 73.  After 10 years, potential DOD savings from fuel. Interest rate of 
return 3 %. Annual savings for split and disaggregated, $1.93 M 
split and $1.98 M for disaggregated. 
Plot shows the monetary value of distributed operations. The difference between 
mission holding all on the LHA versus split and distributed was calculated in dollars. An 
average MEU, including workups, convert to gallons, multiply by $3.64 per gallon of JP-
5. At nominal interest rate of 3%, Figure 73 shows the lost potential savings from mission 
holding.  Two million dollars in fuel savings may seem insignificant; however, when one 
considers the logistics required to transport additional fuel for “holding,” then this result 
can be magnified many times over.  During the recent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the cost to transport fuel to isolated bases cost up to 400 times the original cost of the fuel 
(Rosenthal, 2010). 
(3) MOE (6): Mission Total Time 
The time that it takes to complete the long-range raid is unencumbered by the 
distributing of ACE aircraft from between the LHA and the LPD. The LHA has several 
spots and crews to mitigate the increased launch demands of large packages of aircraft. 
 116 
As previously described we made the LHA worst case with regard to spot availability, 
restricting total numbers of spots and crews for the LHA. 
 
Figure 74.   After 1,000 replications, practically no significant effect on mission 
time. 
(4) Conclusions 
Multiple air capable ships mitigate the risk of any one platform fouling an entire 
operation. Distributing forces on many platforms may be cheaper from smaller less 
complex systems and provide numerous redundant parts. Total mission times may be 
reduced by positioning air capable ships closer to the objective. There was no change to 
total mission time from distributed operations, however, a change in operating procedures 
may decrease mission holding, which might translate into significant monetary savings. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Americans can always refuse to pay the price for maintaining an 
amphibious capability, thereby giving up what Liddell Hart calls “the 
greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses.” If Americans 
should choose to take such a step, they will have, in effect, accomplished 
what no enemy has managed to do: defeat a modern amphibious operation  
—Col Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC (Ret) 
 
This research develops a two-stage model, where we found the most important 
factor to be speed. While this model is by no means the end-all, it provides verification 
and validation for other ACVs, SSCs, AAV upgrades, and amphibious operation models. 
This research supports operationally effective ACVs that operate at speeds much less 
than 40 or even 30 mph. These speeds align closely with the M1A1 tank land speed, and 
are often cited as the top U.S. capability that any future amphibian must meet. The vision 
for the future amphibious fleet has vehicles launching from ranges of 25 nm, 12 nm, and 
5 nm off shore. Speeds, ranges, and quantities of SSCs were all varied in an efficient 
DOE to better understand the complex trade-space of amphibious assault. 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the aftermath of the EFV, the Marine Corps identified a new top acquisition 
priority in the ACV, which is a wheeled, amphibian designed with lessons learned from 
more than 13 years of combat operations. Even with an increasingly fiscally constrained 
force, the vehicle of complementary platforms of SSC must bring Marines to objectives 
quickly and safely. Currently, there are four prototypes being tested. This research uses 
agent-based and discrete-event simulation modeling, combined with a state-of-the-art, 
nearly orthogonal-and-balanced DOE to model an end-to-end amphibious assault. An 
overview of the model-test-model approach is provided in Appendix J.  
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B. ENERGY INSIGHTS 
This research builds on previous SE graduate-level work that found advanced 
platforms like the MV-22 and CH-53K embarked with Marines provide great capacity, 
yet consume great quantities of fuel. This research models a long-range raid complete 
with MV-22s and CH-53Ks, which is one of the most taxing evolutions for not only the 
deck cycle, but for the ACE. The DES in Simio within this document shows the benefit to 
split and disaggregated operations. Specifically, operating procedures exist that may 
reduce mission holding and can be done in a way with no effect on total mission time. 
Meanwhile, several analytical methods and the MANA simulation show that the ACV, 
AAV, and the next SSC should be designed to meet the following specifications: 
 ACV speed: 16 kts/18 mph 
 ACV debark distances of 5 nm and 12 nm 
 LCAC quantities should be greater than two or have operating speeds > 44 
kts 
In summary: 
 A disaggregated and split operation is one way to mitigate excessive 
mission holding. 
 The SSC, ACV, and the AAV upgrade need not be as fast as a tank is on 
land in order to be mission effective and meet requirements. 
C. OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS 
The ability to conduct STOM-V and STOM-S in a variety of ways allows for a 
landing to quickly mass forces and support ashore. During an amphibious assault, the 
defending force has an advantage of concealment and artillery, yet the attack can choose 
the time and place to land to select an advantageous avenue of approach. Operationally, 
SSCs have consisted of AAVs that capably brought many Marines ashore to Kuwait. 
Having amphibious vehicles allows for river and canal crossings, as was the case in Iraq. 
This is not, however, an opposed landing. During an amphibious assault vice an 
amphibious landing, a bigger force is required. More armor is required to defend the 
landing force against the variety of weapons that can be brought to bear during the 
launch, swimming, transition through the surf, and movement inland—all of which 
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cannot happen slowly. Heavily armored vehicles that might hold more may also have 
decreased performance and be vulnerable, compared to medium-sized ACVs. 
This research also looks at the MEU contribution from nonamphibious assault 
landings, when forces are brought in to a secure landing zone. Figure 75 shows Blue and 
Red casualties by scenario. 
 
Figure 75.  What is the most important vehicle type in an amphibious assault? 
Of the four scenarios, scenario 3 masses Blue force the fastest with 
the MV-22; however, dismounted infantry are not afforded the same 
protection as those inside vehicles like the ACV and AAV. 
To give this research the pedigree of a traceable scenario, the author uses EW 12. 
Two ACVs will carry a reinforced squad, which means that with ACVs, Marines will 
have twice the firepower with two RWSs, as opposed to one on the legacy AAV tractor. 
Nevertheless, the affect from a self-deploying amphibious vehicle is a single wave, which 
masses firepower ashore without paying the price of being a serial in a wave of SSCs. 
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1. MOE Insights 
Blue casualties are fewer when just connectors and an autonomous AAV wave are 
used. Blue casualties increase when Marines are dismounted early as with the STOM-V. 
An MV-22 long-range raid does increase Red casualties and the times that Blue attrites 
Red to one-third their strength. Red casualties depend on ACV speed, debark distance, 
LCAC quantity, and LCAC speed. The LCAC is the SSC. Time increases with distance; 
however, the benefit in going from three to four LCACs is not as great as the benefit in 
going from two to three. Depending on the size of the force, there are diminishing returns 
with the arrival of additional LCACs. Here, the fourth LCAC had a negligible impact, 
save functioning as a reserve for the other three. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The Marine Corps and DOD have many highly useful spreadsheet tools and 
calculators for specific needs. Before creating another, this author suggests asking, “What 
is not being modeled because it is too complex?” and then making an attempt to model it. 
Future work includes exploring the metamodels from this simulation in a future decision 
tool that shows operational energy and operational effectiveness. This analysis was broad 
and much can be done to refine it, such as: 
 Impacts of terrain. Adjusting the RGB terrain file at the water’s edge from 
water, to surf, to shore, and then inland. 
 Increased fidelity in the transition through an active surf. 
 Increased ranges and lethality of Red forces. 
 A reduced signature offload of ACVs. 
 Applying methods from Chapter V to: MLP launch of LCAC, LCAC 
launch of ACV, ACV dismount of infantry. 
 Impact of mobile artillery. 
 Increased constraints on the well deck of the LHA/LHD. 
 Egress from the ACV; exploring how best to employ a reinforced squad of 
Marines split between  two ACV vehicles. 
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E. SUMMARY 
 Complex spreadsheet tools, with thousands of lines of VBA, are less 
adaptive than object-oriented models. 
 This research modeled over 100 agents and 75 factors. 
 The LCAC, ACV, AAV, and MV-22 all are distributed systems, but it was 
a self-deployer that provided the desired affect against an enemy in the 
defense. 
 Speed, though highly influential, need not be at top capability to be 
effective. 
 Two million dollars in fuel savings may seem insignificant; however, 
when one considers the logistics required to transport additional fuel for 
“holding,” then this result could be magnified many times over. 
The force that responds to the next crisis or contingency will be the force that is 
closest to it—the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) embarked on ships. This research 
is leaning forward by making a first attempt at modeling an end-to-end amphibious 
assault. In hundreds of thousands of simulated amphibious assaults, we observe the trade-
space formed by the many complex parameters considered when employing concept 
complementary platforms of surface and vertical ship-to-objective-maneuver. In the end, 
we realize quantifiable values that maximize mission effectiveness and better inform the 
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APPENDIX A. COMPLETE TABLE OF BLUE SQUADS 
Table 9.   Complete table of the 113 Blue squads in MANA.  
Squad 







1 LHD None 1 99 0 
2 LPD-19 None 1 99 0 
3 LSD-41 None 1 99 0 
4 LCAC-1-1 3 1 88 430 
5 LCAC-2-1 3 1 88 430 
6 LCAC-3-1 3 1 88 430 
73 LCAC-4-1 3 1 88 430 
7 LCAC-1-2 3 1 88 4720 
8 LCAC-2-2 3 1 88 4720 
9 LCAC-3-2 3 1 88 4720 
74 LCAC-4-2 3 1 88 4720 
10 LCAC-1-3 3 1 88 9010 
11 LCAC-2-3 3 1 88 9010 
12 LCAC-3-3 3 1 88 9010 
13 LCAC-1-4 (NOT ACTIVE) 3 1 88   
14 LCAC-2-4 (NOT ACTIVE) 3 1 88   
15 LCAC-3-4 (NOT ACTIVE) 3 1 88   
75 LCAC-4-3 3 1 88 9010 
34 M1A1-1 4 1 2 0 
35 M1A1-2 5 1 2 0 
36 M1A1-3 7 1 2 0 
37 M1A1-4 8 1 2 0 
76 ACV-P-1 6 1 4 0 
77 ACV-P-2 6 1 4 0 
78 ACV-P-3 6 1 4 0 
79 ACV-P-4 73 1 4 0 
80 ACV-P-5 73 1 4 0 
81 ACV-P-6 73 1 4 0 
82 ACV-P-7 75 1 4 0 
83 ACV-P-8 9 1 4 0 
84 ACV-P-9 9 1 4 0 
85 ACV-P-10 9 1 4 0 
86 ACV-P-11 74 1 4 0 
87 ACV-P-12 74 1 4 0 
88 ACV-P-13 74 1 4 0 
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Squad 







89 ACV-P-14 74 1 4 0 
90 ACV-P-15 12 1 4 0 
91 ACV-P-16 12 1 4 0 
92 ACV-P-17 75 1 4 0 
93 ACV-R-1 6 1 4 0 
94 ACV-C-1 73 1 4 0 
50 Inf-1 76 3 1 0 
51 Inf-2 77 3 1 0 
52 Inf-3 78 3 1 0 
53 Inf-4 79 3 1 0 
54 Inf-5 80 3 1 0 
55 Inf-6 81 3 1 0 
56 Inf-7 82 3 1 0 
57 Inf-8 83 3 1 0 
58 Inf-9 84 3 1 0 
59 Inf-10 85 3 1 0 
60 Inf-11 86 3 1 0 
61 Inf-12 87 3 1 0 
62 Inf-13 88 3 1 0 
63 Inf-14 89 3 1 0 
64 Inf-15 90 3 1 0 
65 Inf-16 91 3 1 0 
66 Inf-17 92 3 1 0 
67 Inf-18 93 3 1 0 
95 Inf-19 94 3 1 0 
96 Inf-20 25 3 1 0 
97 Inf-21 26 3 1 0 
98 Inf-22 27 3 1 0 
99 Inf-23 28 3 1 0 
100 Inf-24 29 3 1 0 
101 Inf-25 30 3 1 0 
102 Inf-26 31 3 1 0 
103 Inf-27 32 3 1 0 
104 Inf-28 33 3 1 0 
105 Inf-29 16 3 1 0 
106 Inf-30 17 3 1 0 
107 Inf-31 18 3 1 0 
108 Inf-32 19 3 1 0 
109 Inf-33 20 3 1 0 
110 Inf-34 21 3 1 0 
111 Inf-35 22 3 1 0 
112 Inf-36 23 3 1 0 
113 Inf-37 24 3 1 0 
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APPENDIX B. FER BY SCENARIO WITH THE RAW OUTPUT 
DATA 
 
Figure 76.  Shows the FER, by scenario, with the non-collapsed data. 
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APPENDIX C. COLLAPSED DATA BY SCENARIO, PAIRED 
 
Figure 77.  One-way analysis of mean “Red casualties” MOE by scenario. 
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APPENDIX D. RAW OUTPUT DATA, PAIRED 
 
Figure 78.  One-way analysis of the mean “Red casualties” MOE by scenario 
with the non-collapsed output data. 
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APPENDIX E. MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION COMPARISON 
TABLE 
 
Figure 80.  MOE “Blue casualties” actual by predicted, summary of fit, 
prediction profiler, and Pareto plots. 
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Figure 81.  MOE “Red casualties” summary of fit, sorted parameter estimates, 
prediction profiler, and Pareto plots. 
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Figure 82.  MOE “time” summary of fit, sorted parameter estimates, prediction 
profiler, and Pareto plots. 
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Figure 83.  MOE “FER” sorted parameter estimates, prediction profiler, and 
Pareto plots. 
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APPENDIX F. “TIME” MOE, MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION, 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Figure 84.  MOE “time” advanced regression model, normal Q-Q plot, closely 
fits along the line, passes the “fat pencil test.” 
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APPENDIX G. ALL 77 MIXED (CONTINUOUS AND DISCRETE) 
FACTORS 
 





Figure 87.  Screen grab of the 12 factors combined using the techniques 
described from Efficient, nearly orthogonal-and-balanced, mixed 
designs: an effective way to conduct trade-off analyses via 
simulation. Retrieved from Vieira, 2013. 
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APPENDIX H. MEANS COMPARISON USING STUDENT T-TEST 
 
 






Figure 89.  Paired comparison, scenarios two and four for statistical significance 
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APPENDIX I. SIMIO AND MANA DASHBOARD COMPARISON 
 
Figure 90.  Screen shot of Simio dashboard 
 
Figure 91.  Screen shot of terrain billboard in MANA. 
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APPENDIX J. APPROACH, MODEL-TEST-MODEL 
 
 
Figure 92.  An illustration of the model-test-model approach, see chapter III for 
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